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TH-E-~A.TIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP IN 
AN ERA OF SCARCE RESOURCES: IS THERE 
A DUTY TO TREAT? 
Maxwell J. Mehlman* 
FOR the past twenty years, the dominant theme in American health care has been the need to control escalating costs. This concern has 
led to the development of new methods for delivering and financing 
care, such as employer-driven managed health care plans1 and the di-
agnosis-based payment system for Medicare. 2 These approaches have 
sought to reduce costs by encouraging health care providers to alter 
their behavior, including decreasing hospital admissions, the length of 
stay in hospitals;3 and the performance of diagnostic and therapeutic 
* Professor of Law and Director, The Law-Medicine Center, Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law. B.A., Reed College (1970); B.A., Oxford University (1972); J.D., Yale Law 
School (1975). The author would like to thank Susan Gornik and Karen Visocan for their re-
searchassistance, the faculty at the University of Washington School of Law for comments on.an 
earlier version of this paper delivered at a faculty workshop, and Jean Carter for her work in 
preparing the manuscript. 
I. A managed health care plan is a health. insurance program in which an administrative 
entity attempts to control patient access to health care providers and provider services in order to 
contain costs. For a lengthier description, see Stanley J. Reiser, Consumer Competence and the 
Reform of American Health Care, 267 JAMA 1511 (1992). 
2. The diagnosis-based payment system for Medicare is a patient classification scheme which 
pays the hospital on the basis of the patient's diagnosis rather than on the basis of the services 
actually provided to the patient. The system is derived by classifying all possible diagnoses identi-
fied in the International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision, Clinical Modification ("ICD-
9-CM") system into 23 major diagnostic categories ("MDCs") based on organ systems, and fur-
ther organizing the diagnoses into 467 diagnosis-related groups ("DRGs"). Patients within the 
same DRG can be expected to evoke a set of clinical responses which, on a statistical average, will 
result in approximately equal use of hospital resources. Unlike the fee-for-serVice payment system 
that it replaced, the DRG system creates no incentive for the hospital to provide additional ser-
vices to patients in order to increase revenue. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww (1988) (describ-
ing the DRG system for hospital payment under Medicare). 
3. Since the inception of the diagnosis-based payment system, "the average length of stay is 
down 10% for patients 65 and over and 6.1% overall. Patient days are down 16% for those 65 
and older and I 7% overall. ... [In addition,] more than 3/.1 of United States hospital beds were 
filled in 1980, [while] less than ¥.l were occupied [by 1988]." Clay Mickel, Excess Capacity Be-
comes Center of Policy Debate, HosPITALS, Sept. 5, 1989, at 38, 39. 
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procedures:; Much of the pressure has been exerted on institutional 
providers, such as hospitals and health maintenance organizations 
("HMOs").~> Directly or indirectly, however, physicians increasingly 
feel the pressure as well. 
Despite the increasing power of institutional providers and payers 
of health care, physicians continue to play the dominant role in deter-
mining the care that patients receive. Patients cannot be admitted or 
discharged from the hospital except on a physician's orders. Diagnostic 
and therapeutic procedures are performed either by physicians or pur-
suant to their instructions.6 For the most part, only physicians can pre-
scribe prescription drugs.7 If costs are to be controlled, it is generally 
recognized that physicians must be induced to change their practice 
4. John Wennberg has demonstrated variations in local practice patterns. Through a technique 
known as "small area analysis," he and .his associates have documented wide variations among 
different New England communities in the rates of performance of certain surgical procedures. 
For instance, the highest rate of tonsillectomies in those areas studied was six times the lowest 
rate, while the rate of hysterectomies displayed a four-fold variation between the highest and 
lowest areas. See John E: Wennberg et al., Will Payment Based on Diagnostic-Related Groups 
Control Hospital Costs?, 311 NEW ENG. J. IviED. 295 (1984); John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, 
Variations in Medical Care Among Small Areas, Sci. AM., Apr. 1982, at !20; John Wennberg & 
Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCIENCE 1002 (1973). 
M:ark Hall notes that "if the existing !ega! standard is as broad as Wennberg's evidence suggests, 
it can amply accommodate massive cutbacks in care within the tremendous variations in practice 
patterns that the established custom encompasses." Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard 
Under Health Care Cost Containme/11, 17 LAW IviED. & HEALTH CARE 347, 348 {1989). 
5: Hospitals and HMOs have felt the pressure to limit'procedmes due to the Medicare DRG 
system. Because they are paid according to the diagnosis rather than the services rendered, they 
are compelled to reduce services in order to reduce costs. See st~pra note 2. HMOs typically 
emphasize their relatively low costs. However, that advantage would likely be lost if they did not 
limit procedures and lengths of stay. See John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary 
Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. Rtv. 439, 454 (1991). 
6. However, some states permit non-physicians to engage in certain forms of medical practice. 
For example, Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Texas have laws which allow the practice of mid-
wifery. See Leigh v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 481 N.E.2d 1347 (Mass. 1985) (mere 
practice of midwifery did not constitute the unauthorized practice of medicine; no statutory prohi-
bition against the practice of midwifery by lay persons); Leggit v. Tennessee Bd. of Nursing, 612 
S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1980) (midwifery excluded from the practice of medicine by state 
statutes and regulations); Banti v. Texas, 289 S.\V.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956) (practice of 
midwifery by lay person is not unauthorized practice of medicine). 
7. $orne states permit non-physicians such as physicians' assistants to prescribe some prescrip-
tion drugs. See, e.g., Cook v. Workers' Compensation Dept., 758 P.2d 854, 859 (Or. 1988) (en 
bane) ("Nurse practitioners also are eligible to apply for prescription privileges upon completion 
of an approved course of pharmacology."); United States v. Composite State Bd. of Medical Ex-
aminers, 656 F.2d 131 (5th Cir. 1981) (allowing a Georgia physicians' assistant to prescribe and 
order routine medication). But see United States v. Jones, 816 F.2d 1483 (lOth Cir. 1987) (stat-
ing that, notwithstanding valid medical reasons, an individual must be a physician registered with 
the DEA in order to prescribe medication). 
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patterns. 
This recognition has led to cost control efforts aimed specifically at 
physicians. Third-party payers, such as government entitlement pro-
grams, insurers, and employers, are beginning to second-guess physi-
cians' decisions by requiring prior approval before services are provided 
to patients or before the physicians' claims for reimbursement are paid. 
Physicians· also are being given financial incentives to limit care. For 
example, a physician may have a portion of his fees withheld, to be 
returned to him at the end of a budget period only if he has success-
fully held down costs.8 Sometimes the pressures are less direct. For ex-
ample, hospital administrators are reported to threaten physicians with 
sanctions, such as limiting or revoking their admitting privileges, if 
they exceed the lengths of stay prescribed by third-party payers.9 
While these cost containment efforts may be design_ed to achieve a 
societal goal of reducing health care costs, they impact directly on pa-
tients by creating the risk that physicians will withhold beneficial medi-
cal services. For example, several cases have addressed allegations that, 
as a result of efforts by providers or third-party payers to contain costs, 
patients have lost limbs or have committed suicide because their physi-
cians prematurely discharged them from the hospitaJ.l° Cost contain-
ment may be desirable and even necessary, but is it appropriate to 
8. See Alan A. Hillman et aL, How Do Financial Incentives Affect PhysiCians' Clinical Deci-
sions and the Financial Performance of HMO"s, 321 NEw ENG. J. MED. 86, 87 (1989): 
In a typical HMO, the insurer divides the premiums received from enrollees into several 
special-purpose "referral" funds to pay for the services of primary care physicians, those 
of specialists and hospitals, and outpatient laboratory testing. In addition, a percentage of 
the payment for primary care physicians is often withheld until the end of the year, when 
the status of the referral funds is determined. The amount withheld is returned to the 
physicians if there is a surplus in the referral funds, but not if there is a deficit. Primary 
care physicians who overspend the referral funds may incur additional penalties, and sur-
!d. 
pluses in the funds may be used to create bonuses for parsimonious physicians. 
9. "Staff model" HMOs, in which physicians are salaried employees of the HMO, may refuse 
to renew the contracts of physicians who overuse services. See Paul Craig, Health Maintenance 
Organization Gatekeeping Policies: Potential Liability for Deterring Access to Emergency Medi-
cal Services, 23 J. HEALTH AND HosP. L. 135, 136 (1990); see also Hillman et aL, supra note 8, 
at 87 (providing additional examples of sanctions for a lack of cost control). Hospital administra-
tors often issue quiet warnings or even threaten to revoke staff privileges of physicians whose 
patients cost the hospital too much money. See E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclosure and 
Economic Advocacy, New Duties in the Medical Standard of Care, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275, 284 
(1991). Because the doctor who is not cost conscious will pay a price professionally or financially, 
the physician is placed in a type of conflict of interest. 
10. See Wickline v. California, 239 CaL Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986) (leg amputated as a result 
of premature discharge from hospital); Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. CaL, 271 CaL Rptr. 876 (Ct. 
App. 1990) (patient committed suicide after early discharge from hospital). 
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achieve it chiefly at the expense of patients?11 This question bears di-
rectly on the behavior of physicians in relation to patients and raises 
the most difficult issue that physicians confront: As cost containment 
efforts increasingly limit health care resources, to what extent are phy-
sicians required to furnish access to health care regardless of resource 
constraints? 12 
The answer might be sought within the principles of professional 
ethics, butno ethical consensus on this issue has emerged. Some com-
mentators assert that the physician must maximize his patient's welfare 
without concern for costs. For example, the Principles of Ethics of the 
American Medical Association state that, notwithstanding the societal 
interest in containing health care costs, "concern for the care the pa-
tient receives will be the physician's first consideration."13 Other ex-
perts argue that, in addition to his role as care-giver, the physician is a 
gate-keeper who must subordinate the interests of an individual patient 
if necessary to attain societal· <;:ost containment objectives.14 
In their relationship with patients, physicians are bound not only 
by the ethics of their profession, but by rules of common law.15 The 
physician owes the patient a legal duty to provide reasonable care. He 
risks liability for malpractice and other sanctions if he fails to provide 
the care to a patient that would be provided by a reasonable physician 
under the same circumstances, even if he is prevented from doing so by 
limited resources.16 The law also imposes a fiduciary duty on the physi-
II. Wickline and Wilson demonstrate that the detriment to the patient is not offset by a direct 
reduction in her health insurance costs. The patient bears the full burden of the harm herself, 
while the cost savings are spread across all insureds in the form of reduced premiums. 
12. The answer to the question may depend on the nature of the resource constraint and on 
the manner in which it affects the patient. Resource constraints can take different forms: the 
patient can lack sufficient funds to pay for services; a third-party payer may provide only partial 
coverage for a service or may refuse to provide coverage altogether; a provider may be pressured 
to economize on the care provided to patients through mechanisms such as payment on a capi-
tated basis; or a geographic area may lack a type of facility or piece of equipment, such as a 
pediatric intensive care unit or a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") device. 
13. AMERICAN MEDICAL Ass'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE 
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS § 2.09 (1992). 
14. See, e.g., Jacqueline J. Glover & Gail J. Povar, The Ethics of Cost-Conscious Physician 
Reimbursement, in PAYING THE DOCTOR: HEALTH POLICY AND PHYSICIAN REIMBURSEMENT 19, 
22-23 (Jonathan D. Moreno ed., 1991). 
15. In some respects the rules of common law which govern the patient-physician relationship 
have been changed or supplemented by legislative enactment. However, most jurisdictions con-
tinue to rely on the rules of common law. For a discussion of statutory changes, see infra notes 
123-26 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra part II. For a discussion of civil sanctions which a state may impose upon a 
delinquent physician, see Richard P. Kusserow et al., An .Overview of State Medical Discipline, 
257 JAMA 820 (1987). 
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cian to act in his patient's best interests.17 The physician might be lia-
ble for punitive damages if be violates this duty in order to promote the 
interest of others in reducing health care costs.18 
From a legal standpoint, then, the question becomes: To what ex-
tent do the rules of common law governing the patient-physician rela-
tionship require that the physician provide access to health care regard-
less of resource constraints? If the physician withholds care and is sued 
by the patient for malpractice, can the physician assert that he acted 
reasonably in light of limited resources? Can the physician argue, for 
example, that he is not required to furnish the care because the pa-
ti<::nt's third-party payer refuses to pay and the patient herself cannot 
pay? Can a rural or inner-city physician defend himself by arguing 
that he is not required to furnish a certain type of care, such as state-
of-the-art magnetic resonance diagnostic imaging, if the equipment 
necessary to render the care is not available in the area because it is 
too expensive? Can he assert as a defense that the scarce resources 
saved by denying care to one patient can be better spent on other pa-
tients, or that, by denying care to some patients, health care costs for 
other patients can be reduced? Finally, can the physician avoid liability 
by arguing that the patient agreed to receive care that fell below the 
standard of "reasonableness" because the physician agreed to charge 
her a lower price and she could not otherwise afford care? 
This Article examines the three major areas of common law that 
govern the patient-physician relationship: contract law, tort law, and 
fiduciary law. It explores the definition of the patient-physician rela-
tionship within each doctrine and the extent to which physicians must 
furnish care to patients regardless of resource constraints. After con~ 
eluding that the common law cannot ensure that individual patients 
receive access to needed health care services, the Article explores how 
the law might be changed to achieve this result. 
I. THE ROLE OF CONTRACT 
In order to determine whether a physician has a duty to render 
health care regardless of resource constraints, we will first look to the 
law of contract. If the patient-physician relationship were governed by 
a purely contractual approach, the answer would be rather simple. In a 
purely contractual relationship, the parties themselves establish the 
17. See infra part III. 
18. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
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terms of their relationship. Thus, they can agree to any arrangement 
that suits them regarding the performance to be expected from each 
other' including allowing services to be withheld under certain circum-
stances or to be rendered in a manner that would be substandard in the 
absence of a contractual agreement. 
Application of a purely-contractual approach to the patient-physi-
cian relationship would require the physician to furnish the patient 
with only those services that he had agreed to provide. If third-party 
payers were unwilling to pay for necessary services, the physician could 
insist that the patient pay for the services out of her own pocket and 
could refuse to provide the services or terminate the relationship if she 
declined. H the patient wanted to ensure that she received services be-
yond those covered by her insurer, she could bargain with the physician 
and agree to pay the additional price, find another physician who. was 
willing to provide the services at a lower price, or find another insurer 
who offered broader coverage. The patient could not sue the physician 
for failing to provide a service unless the physician had agreed to pro-
vide the service as part of the contract. 
Similarly, the parties would be free to establish the performance 
standards within the relationship. The physician would only be held to 
a standard of "reasonable care" if the parties agreed upon that stan-
dard. The patient might prefer to bargain for a higher standard, such 
as "optimal care." If the patient did not wish to pay for a reasonable 
standard of care, she could agree to accept a lesser standard at a lower 
price. 19 In theory, the parties could even decide that the physician did 
not owe the patient a fiduciary duty20 or could define that duty in 
whatever fashion they pleased. 
A purely contractual approach to the patient-physician relation-
ship is suggested by two divergent theories. One is neoclassic economic 
theory, which proposes that rational, self-interested individuals will 
bargain with each other to maximize their individual welfare until they 
19. A statement of this proposal is found in Richard A. Epstein, J11edical I11alpractice: The 
Case for Contract, 1976 AM. B. FoUND. RES. J. 87. See also Clark C. Havighurst, Private Reform 
of Tort-Law Dogma: Markel Opportunities and Legal Obstacles, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Spring 1986, at 143, 149 (suggesting that strong reasons exist to allow a provider to vary the 
extent of legal obligations incurred so that a more economical product can be provided for those 
consumers who wish to secure it); Richard A. Epstein, Medical Malpractice, Imperfect Informa-
tion, and che Comractual Foundation for Medical Services, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 
1986, at 201 [hereinafter Epstein, lmperfecl Information] (suggesting that allowing private par-
ties to contract for medical care will result in better care and more beneficial malpractice 
resolutions). 
20. For discussion of a physician's fiduciary duty to his patient, see infra part IlL 
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attain an equilibrium state, known as Pareto optimality, in which addi-
tional trades will not result in further mutual benefit. This state is 
deemed to be an optimal state for the parties which will produce an 
efficient allocation of resources within society. In terms of health care, 
patients would be expected to bargain for access to services and for 
standards of physician behavior that best suited their individual needs. 
The theory also holds that individual welfare-maximizing transactions, 
taken together, will result in an optimal societal allocation of health 
care resources relative to other desired goods and services.21 
A contractual approach to the patient-physician relationship is 
also suggested by a development specifically related to health care: the 
movement to increase patient autonomy. This movement originated in 
the late 1960s as a response to physician paternalism and professional 
domination of the patient-physician relationship.22 The movement sub-
stituted for paternalism a model of shared decision making in which 
the physician is primarily a communicator and facilitator who assists 
the patient. The legal tool of the move toward patient autonomy is the 
principle of patient consent to treatment, which has been elevated from 
a technical requirement that the physician obtain the patient's consent 
to a touching to avoid being liable for battery,23 to a major obligation 
of the physician to transmit suffic;ient information about alternatives, 
risks, and benefits to the patient. This information enables the patient 
to make her own treatment decisions in consultation with the 
physician.24 
The theoretical basis of the doctrine of informed consent has much 
21. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcONOMICS 44-45, 49-51 
(1988). 
22. For discussion of the information gap between patients and physicians, and the physicians' 
dominance resulting therefrom, see James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Gove;n-
ment"s Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAND. 
L. REv. 849, 861 (1981 ); Randall R. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: 
An Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 965, 967 (1981); Epstein, Imperfect Information, 
supra note 19, at 202; William H. Ginsberg et al., Contractual Revisions to Medical Malpractice 
Liability, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 253, 264; Clark C. Havighurst, Competition 
in Health Services: Overview, Issues, and Answers, 34 VAND. L. REv. 1117, 1122-23 (1981). 
23. See Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hasp., 88 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. 1958) (where no emergency 
exists, a physician who can ascertain alternative situations prior to an operation should inform the 
patient of such alternatives); Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905) (doctor found liable 
for battery for failure to secure patient's consent to an operation). 
24. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); 
Sard v. Hardy, 367 A.2d 525 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); see also Marjorie M. Schultz, From 
Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985) (ex-
plaining importance of patient autonomy). 
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in common with the neoclassic economic approach described earlier. 
Both theories assume that only the patient can know her own prefer-
ences and aversion to risk; therefore, allowing her to make decisions for 
herself is the most efficient means to enable her to maximize her own 
welfare. Once the patient is allowed to make her own treatment deci-
sions, it follows that she should be allowed to make other decisions re-
garding her relationship with her physician, such as determining what 
legal obligations to impose on him, and what costs or risks to bear her~ 
self. For example, after being informed by her physician about the risks 
and benefits of treatment alternatives, the patient might be said to as-
sume the risk of harm if she chooses a treatment that the physician 
does not advocate, or one that his colleagues would reject as unreasona-
ble.25 If the patient is adequately instructed regarding the trade-offs, 
why should she not be allowed to bargain with the phy~ieian over the 
dimensions of price, quantity, and quality? Should she not be permitted 
to agree to the level of care which the physician will provide in ex-
change for his fee and allow him to reduce the amount of care to con-
serve her scarce resources? Why should she not be free to hold the 
physician to a lesser standard of care in return for a lower price? 26 
Despite the superficial appeal of a purely contractual approach 
and the supportive thrust of the doctrine of informed consent, the 
courts virtually without exception have rejected the proposition that pa-
tients and physicians should be allowed to bargain over the terms of 
their relationship. For example, courts have struck down the following 
types of patient-physician agreements: a patient's release of the physi-
cian from liability for negligence,27 a limitation of the patient to 
25. See Schneider v. Rivici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987) (allowing validity of such an express 
assumption of risk to be decided by jury in malpractice case rather than holding defense invalid as 
a matter of law). 
26. Allowing a physician to provide the type and amount of information for which the patient 
bargained would constitute the ultimate marriage of contract theory and the informed consent 
doctrine. A patient who desired a significant amount of information would pay more than those 
patients who wanted less information. See Maxwell j_ Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limita-
tions on Bargaining Between Patients and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 365, 374-
88 (1990) (discussing why this approach is problematic due to the nature of the market for 
information). 
27. See Olson v. Molzen, 558 S.W.2d 429 (Tenn. 1977); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 
S.E.2d 903 (Ga. !98!); Meiman v. Rehabilitation Ctr., 444 S.W.2d 78 (Ky. !969); see also Tunic! 
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 44! (Cal. !963) (rejecting agreement between patient and 
hospital releasing hospital from liability); Abramowitz v. New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 494 
N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 1985) (same regarding agreement with dental clinic); Leidy v. Deseret 
Enters., Inc., 381 A.2d 164 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (same regarding post-operative therapy center). 
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$15,000 in damages,28 and an acceptance of binding arbitration by the 
patient.29 In fact, courts have even refused to uph<;>ld agreements by the 
patient to pay a fee that the court deemed unreasonable.30 The only 
cases in which the courts have been willing to uphold agreements to 
limit the physician's liability have involved experimental or unconven-
tional treatments that the patient agreed to try after being fully in-
formed of the risks and benefits, only to claim later that the physician 
had acted unreasonably in failing to employ a more conventional ap-
proach. However, these cases can be distinguished on a public policy 
basis. It may be argued that failing to hold the patient to her agree-
ment would render the physician strictly liable for any harm to the 
patient merely by virtue of employing an experimental modality, and, 
as a result, legitimate experimentation would be unduly _discouraged.31 
In refusing to uphold bargains between patients and physicians, the 
courts have not always provided a clear basis for their objections. 32 The 
latent explanation for such objections is the inability of a purely con-
tract-based relationship between patients and providers to achieve the 
efficiency goals of contract theory itself. 
Contract theory, like the neo~lassic economic theory upon which it 
is based, assumes that the parties possess equal bargaining power and 
28. See Tatham v. Hoke, 469 F. Supp. 914 {W.D.N.C. 1979). 
29. See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 {Ct. App. 1976) {admission form 
which included arbitration agreement constituted contract of adhesion and was therefore unen-
forceable). But see Madden v. Kaiser, 552 P.2d 1178 {Cal. 1976) {patient held to binding arbitra-
tion which had been agreed to by bargaining agent acting on patient's behalf). 
30. See Spencer v. West, 126 So. 2d 423 {La. Ct. App. 1960) {ruling that physician's charge 
of $1939 for services valued at approximately $525 by other doctors was excessive and should be 
reduced to $650, despite patient's ability to pay entire charge); Chattanooga-Hamilton County 
Hosp. Auth. v. Price, No. 614, 1988 WL 27230 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1988) {providing that 
court can consider reasonableness of hospital charges). 
31. See Schneider v. Rivici, 817 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1987); Colton v. New York Hosp., 414 
N.Y.S.2d 866 {Sup. Ct. 1979). Schneider's factual scenario is problematic in that the physician 
defendant was not engaged in legitimate research; rather, he was employing a technique to treat 
cancer that might be considered quackery. After a period of time, howeve~, he allegedly advised 
his patient to discontinue the treatment because it had not proven effective. In any event, the court 
did not hold that the patient's release of the physician from liability was valid, but only that the 
validity of the agreement was an issue for the jury to decide. For a discussion of the legitimacy of 
subordinatiJ]g a patient's protection to the interests of society, see infra notes 55-56 and accompa-
nying text. 
32. The most extensive analysis is presented in Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 
441 {Cal. 1963), which has been criticized as unpersuasive, incomplete, and inoperative. See 
Gardner v. Downtown Porsche Audi, 225 Cal. Rptr. 757, 759 {Ct. App. 1986) {criticizing Tunk/ 
factors as not providing adequate guidance); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking. the Allocation of 
Medical Malpractice Risks Between Patients and Providers, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 
1986, at 173, 184-85. 
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equal, if not complete, information about the nature and consequences 
of their transactions.33 Yet in terms of the patient-physician relation-
ship, tlfe physician possesses far greater bargaining power and far supe-
rior information. The physician's greater bargaining power stems from 
the following factors: his status as a professional; the patient's need for 
health care services and the lack of competition between health care 
providers, which limits the patient's choices to obtain care elsewhere;34 
the physician's greater medical knowledge and expertise;35 and the 
"credence" nature of health care services, which makes it difficult for 
the patient to determine the quality of the services and therefore to 
determine what price to pay.36 . 
This imbalance undermines the assumption that a contractual ar-
rangement between the patient and physician will produce an efficient 
result.37 In the first place, due to the lack of information aqout the 
relationship between quality and price of medical care, it is improbable 
that the parties will agree to a price that will yield the desired degree 
of quality (for example, imagine trying to arrive at a price for an auto-
mobile without knowing what brand or model was being purchased). 
Even if information about price andquality were available, the physi-
cian's training and expertise would make it more likely for him-as 
opposed to the patient-to possess the information or to obtain it 
33. See generally COOTER & ULilN, supra note 21, at 235. 
34. See M. Traska, Home Health Care: Hospital's Activities Vary by Region Across the Na-
tion, HOSPITALS, Feb. 5, 1986, at 54. 
35. See Epstein, Imperfect Information, supra note 19, at 202; Robinson, supra note 32, at 
188 (arguing that the information gap can be filled by requiring disclosure by the physician). 
36. A "credence good" is one whose quality cannot be detected even after it is experienced. In 
contrast, the quality of a "search good" can be determined by the purchaser. prior to purchase, 
while the purchaser of an "experience good" can determine quality by experiencing the good after 
it has been purchased. Health care is a "credence good" because patients typically cannot evalu-
ate whether or not they have received high quality care from a clinical standpoint. A favorable 
·result following an episode of care cannot necessarily be attributed to the care, since the patient's 
condition might have improved of its own accord. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and the 
Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. EcoN. REv. 941, 951-52 (1963); David Hemenway, 
Thinking About Quality: The EConomic Perspective, 9 QuALITY REV. BuLL 321, 325 (1983). 
37. Cooter and Freedman note that disloyalty could be controlled or prevented by contract if 
the parties to a fiduciary agreement possessed perfect information. However, they proceed to state 
that the parties in a fiduciary relationship are unable to foresee the conditions under which one act 
produces better results than another. See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary 
Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1045, 1048 
(1991). For more on the inefficiencies of such contracts, see Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 
CAL. L. REV. 795 (1983); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Meiaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary 
Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879; Mehlman, supra note 26, at 388-91 (arguing that fiduciary 
contracting requires communication of information from the physician to the patient to ensure 
efficiency). 
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cheaply. Together with the patient's need for health care ser-
vices--often a dire need-and the lack of meaningful alternatives,38 the 
physician's superior information may enable him to take advantage of 
the patient by appropriating surplus gains from trade for himself. 39 The 
patient's· only means to prevent such appropriation is to expend re-
sources to monitor the physician's behavior. Due to her information 
deficits, however, the patient cannot determine the proper amount to 
expend on monitoring.4° Furthermore, monitoring a professional is ex-
pensive, particularly when the servi<;:es delivered are of a credence type; 
only another professional of equal or greater expertise is likely to be 
able to detect a breach of the contract terms.41 Finally, the more the 
patient spends on monitoring the physician, the less she has left for 
purchasing health care.42 
In rejecting a purely contractual approach, the common law recog-
nizes the power imbalance between the parties by protecting the pa-
tient from the risks of arm's-length bargaining. In its place, the law 
imposes a set of non-negotiable tort and fiduciary duties on the physi-
38. See Judith H. Hibbard & Edward C. Weeks, The Dissemination of Physician Fee Infor-
mation: Impact on Consumer Knowledge, Attitudes, and Behaviors, I .J. HEALTH & Soc. PoL'Y 
75, 82 (1989) (noting that.only a minority of patients engage in consumerist behavior). 
39. See RiCHARD LIPSEY & PETER STEINER, ECONOMICS 459-61 (6th ed. 1981) (explaining 
economics and profits relating to health care issues and physician's ability to take advantage of 
patient due to superior knowledge).· 
40. This is a variation on the principal-agent problem in economics. For illustration of the 
scope of the model in economics, see Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Agency, in PRINCIPALS 
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 37 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 
1985); Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 
EcoNOMETRICA 7 (1983); Oliver D. Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, The Theory of Contracts, in AD-
VANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY, FiFTH WORLD CoNGRESS 71 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987); 
BENGT HOLMSTROM & JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF THE FiRM (Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Dept. of Economics Working Paper No. 456, 1987); DeMott, supra note 37, at 879. 
41. The patient could rely on external monitors such as professional disciplinary bodies or the 
government. However, the patient-physician relationship would no longer be purely a matter of 
private contract. Furthermore, it would become necessary to establish some preexisting standards 
in order to govern the behavior of the external monitors. Such monitoring of the monitor would 
create a sort of infinite regression. 
42. One proposed solution is for the patient to rely on third-party payers to negotiate with 
providers on the patient's behalf. See Havighurst, supra note 22, at 1133 (by virtue of group 
organization, most consumers are now able to obtain expert assistance in choosing insurance pack-
ages); Havighurst, supra note 19, at 147 ("Although consumer ignorance had long been deemed 
to preclude a workably competitive market for health services,. consumers of health care are en-
countering no appreciable difficulties in the emerging competitive environment because they have 
been able to rely upon sophisticated agents [such as employers and unions] to bargain with provid-
ers on their behalf."). Among other things, however, this solution assumes that third-party payers 
will endeavor to maximize the patient's welfare rather than their own or the welfare of a pool of 
patients. See Mehlman, supra note 26, at 375-77. 
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cian as the more powerful party.43 The duties that the courts impose 
may not always achieve optimal results, but the law assumes that ex-
ternally imposed terms governing the relationship are more likely to 
lead to an efficient result than terms negotiated by the parties 
themselves.44 
However, there remains one critical respect in which the rules of 
contract control the terms of the patient-physician relationship under 
common law. The formation of the patient-physician relationship con-
tinues to be based upon the contractual doctrine of mutual assent.45 
That is, the physician must agree to enter into a relationship with a 
patient before he is required to treat the patient and to fulfill the other 
duties externally imposed upon him.46 He cannot be forced to assume 
these obligations against his will.47 Contract retains a central role, but 
is one step removed from the interaction of the parties within their re-
lationship: If the physician does not like the terms impose'd upon the 
patient-physician relationship by the common law, he cannot vary 
them; however, he can decline to enter into the relationship with the 
patient in the first place. We will label this contract principle "Axiom 
1" and return to it later. 
In summary, an exploration of contract law provides only a partial 
answer to the question of whether the physician is required to provide 
access to services regardless of resource constraints. We have not iden-
tified those obligations imposed upon physicians within the relationship; 
we only know that the physician is not free to escape or to lessen them 
by negotiating with the patient. Axiom 1 tells us that the physician can 
refuse to enter into the relationship with the patient in the first place. 
This suggests that if the physician is required to treat patients regard-
43. See infra parts II and III. 
44. One might also argue that the Jaw rejects a purely contractual approach because such an 
approach would yield unfair results for patients. However, contract's failure to render an efficient 
result makes this argument unnecessary. 
45. For an older case exemplifying the common Jaw approach, see Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 
N.E. 1058 (Ind. 1901) (finding no duty to aid person in peril). 
46. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 442. 
47. By statute, the common law has been changed to a limited degree. The federal govern-
ment requires hospitals and physicians receiving Medicare reimbursement to treat emergency pa-
tients in certain situations. The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("CO-
BRA"), which took effect April 7, 1986, imposes three responsibilities on hospitals offering 
emergency medical care: the hospitals must examine all patients· seeking emergency care; the 
hospital must stabilize the patient if an emergency exists, or transport the patient to a facility that 
can; and the hospital cannot transfer an unstable patient unless another facility can offer better 
treatment. See Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 
§ 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 164 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988)). 
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less of resource constraints once he enters into the relationship, he can 
avoid the problem by not initiating the relationship. But we do not yet 
know if, or to what extent, this treatment obligation will be imposed on 
him, and therefore we cannot predict whether, or under what circum-
stances, he will take advantage of the escape route that Axiom 1 
affords. 
II. THE ROLE OF TORT 
A second set of rules that the law imposes on the patient-physician 
relationship is the law of torts. Once the relationship is created by mu-
tual assent, tort rules intervene to establish the standard of care owed 
by the physician.48 In tort terms, the problem of the physician's role in 
the face of resource constraints translates into the following question: 
Does tort law prescribe a "unitary" standard of care, under which the 
physician must behave reasonably regardless of resource constraints, or 
does the law allow resource constraints to be taken into consideration in 
determining what is reasonable? 
Many commentators urge that physicians must treat all patients 
alike regardless of their ability to pay, their health insurance coverage, 
or their area's availability of state-of-the-art health care facilities or 
equipment.49 Any other approach, they contend, would legitimize a 
two-tiered system in which physicians would be free to deliver inferior 
care to the poor.50 According to this argument, resource considerations 
should not vary the standard of care. 
Other commentators, such as Mark Hall, assert that the current 
48. Tort rules also govern the standard of care for the patient by establishing the standard for 
contributory or comparative negligence. 
49. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, Medical Malpractice and Cost Containment: Tightening the 
Screws, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 985, 1025 (1986); Leslie C. Giordani, Comment, A Cost Con-
tainment Malpractice Defense: Implications for the Standard of Care and for Indigent Patients, 
26 Hous. L. REV. 1007, 1030-31 (1989); Note, Rethinking Medical Ma/p~;actice Law in Light of 
Medicare Cost-Cutting, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1004, 1019 (I 985); see also Meiselman v. Crown 
Heights Hosp., 34 N.E.2d 367, 369 (N.Y. 1941) (finding prima facie case on issues of malpractice 
and willful abandonment where boy severely crippled due to doctors' failure io continue treatment 
because of patient's inability to pay); Gray v. Davidson, 130 P.2d 341, 345 (Wash. 1942) (ceasing 
treatment of unemployed plaintiff would create liability if causally linked to plaintiff's harm). 
50. See Paul Starr, Medical Care and the Pursuit of Equality in America, in 2 SECURING 
ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 3 (President's Comm'n for the Study of Ethi~al Problems in Medicine 
and Biomedical and Behavioral Researched., 1983) (showing that hospitals provide less care or a 
lower quality of care to indigent patients); see also Jack Hadley et al., Comparison of Uninsured 
and Privately Insured Hospital Patients, Condition on Admission, Resource Use, and Outcome, 
265 JAMA 374 (1991) (demonstrating that hospitals generally devote significantly fewer re-
sources to uninsured patients). 
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standard is flexible enough to take resource constraints into account.51 
Generally, the basic tort standard of what is "reasonable" is estab-
lished by the medical profession. 5 2 If the profession feels that it is being 
forced to render care without regard to resource constraints, it can sim-
ply reinterpret the standard_ to reflect those constraints. If physicians in 
rural areas lack state-of-the-art imaging machines, for example, the 
profession can adopt a standard of care under which use of the ma-
chines in rural areas is not required. 53 
Haavi Morreim has argued that the current standard of reasona-
bleness does not contain this degree of flexibility because courts possess 
the ability to set the standard of care regardless of where it is set by 
the custom of the profession.54 She maintains, however, that vesting 
judges with such authority is ill-advised. In her. opinion, the law should 
be changed to reflect a bifurcated standard: Under this standard, physi-
cians would be held to a standard of competence that ignores resource 
constraints. However, they would not be obligated to provide access be-
yond what the patient had contractually bargained for with the pro-
51. See Mark A. Hall, The Malpractice Standard Under Health_Care Cost Containment, 17 
LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 347 (1989). Siliciano makes a similar argument by analogy to 
products liability law. He contends, for example, that the driver who chooses to purchase a small 
car with few safety features and who is subsequently injured in an automobile accident would not 
be permitted to recover against the manufacturer on the basis that the car did not protect her as 
well as a more expensive model. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 439. 
52. While courts retain the power to reject the professional standard, see New England Coal 
& Coke Co .. v. Northern Barge Corp. (In re Eastern Transp. Co.), 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) 
(owner of tugboat liable even though such tugs were universally not equipped with a radio to 
receive storm warnings), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 662 (1932); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 
(Wash. 1974) (universal practice of ophthalmologists not to administer glaucoma tests to patients 
under age 40 was negligent); Hall, supra note 51, at 349, they rarely do so. 
53. Hall asserts that the argument that the standard of care can take resource limits into 
consideration is also supported by the courts' rejection of the strict locality rule. The purpose of 
moving to a national or "similar locality" standard, he argues, is to prevent the profession from 
relying too heavily on resource limits at the local level to escape liability for substandard care. See 
Hall, supra note 5 I, at 350. While this argument is clever, it ignores the fact that courts began to 
move away from the strict locality rule long before the issue of cost containment-and the result-
ing recognition of resource constraints-arose. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins Hosp. v. Genda, 258 A.2d 
595, 598 (Md. 1969) (employing similar locality test); Lane v. Calvert, I 38 A.2d 902, 905 (Md. 
1958) (degree of skill required of physician is what is "ordinarily exercised by others in the pro-
fession generally"). The more likely explanation for the rejection of the strict locality rule is that 
the rule denies plaintiffs adequate access to expert witnesses. 
54. See Morreim, supra note 9, at 317 ("[C]ourts are increasingly requiring ... a national, 
basically uniform standard .... "); E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of 
Medical Care, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1719, 1724 (1987) ("[A]s health resources become increasingly 
stratified, should the standard of care become similarly stratified? Currently, the law answers this 
question with an emphatic 'no.' "); see also cases cited supra note 52. 
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vider or with third-party payers. In any event, the outcome is the same 
under the approach of either Morreim or Hall. The physician would be 
entitled to assert resource constraints as a defense to a charge of sub-
standard care so long as the physician met the standard of reasonable 
care under the circumstances. 
Are these critics correct in arguing that the theory of tort law is 
compatible with a defense of limited resources to a charge of substan-
dard care? The answer to this question lies in an understanding of what 
tort law means by "reasonableness." In essence, this is a standard 
designed to maximize social utility. 55 Risks and resulting injuries can 
be imposed on victims without compensation so long as the person cre-
ating the risk acts in a manner that yields net societal gain. In short, 
the objective of tort law is utilitarian: the good of the individual can be 
sacrificed to increase the good of the whole.56 
Once the standard of reasonableness is understood as essentially 
utilitarian, it is not surprising that we find commentators like Hall and 
Morreim asserting that the standard of care should vary to reflect re-
source constraints. The only issue is whether a flexible standard-under 
which some patients appropriately may be denied treatment because of 
resource limits-is likely to achieve greater societal benefit than an in-
flexible standard. It is difficult to argue that denying treatments to a 
patient would never maximize social utility. Hence, a unitary standard 
may not be appropriate in all cases. For example, it is possible that, 
55. See George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 557 
(I 972). Fletcher notes that reasonableness provides a test for activities that should be encouraged 
and that reasonable men presumably seek to maximize utility. Thus, to ask what a reasonable 
man would do is to inquire into the justifiability of the risk. He proceeds to state that the para-
digm of reasonableness 
challenged the assumption that the issue of liability could be decided on the grounds of 
fairness to both victim and defendant without considering the impact on society at 
large .... [F]ault came to be an inquiry about the context and the reasonableness of the 
defendant's risk-creating conduct. ... It provided the medium for tying ... liability to 
maximization of social utility. 
!d. at 557-58 . 
. 56. Fletcher further notes that reasonableness is determined by a straightforward balancing of 
costs and benefits. If the risk yields a net societal utility (benefit), it is reasonable and the victim is 
not entitled to recover from the risk creator; however, if the risk yields a net societal disutility 
(cost), it is not reasonable and the victim is entitled to recover. !d. at 542. Similarly, Henry Terry 
suggests that the test for justifying risks is a utilitarian comparison of the benefits and costs of the 
defendant's risk creating activity. See Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REv. 40 (1915); 
see also Beatty v. Central Iowa Ry., 12 N.W. 332 (Iowa 1882) (employing cost benefit analysis to 
hold that railroad need not eliminate all risk when designing a grade crossing); Felske v. Detroit 
United Ry., 130 N.W. 676 (Mich. 1911) (defendant owner of a streetcar company not liable for 
injury caused by train jumping the tracks). 
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from a utilitarian standpoint, denying expensive lifesaving resources to 
one elderly patient so that many mothers can receive adequate prenatal 
care would produce a greater societal benefit."' H may be difficult to 
determine if a particular level of access produces the maximum amount 
of societal benefit. Juries and judges may disagree over whether a phy-
sician in a particular case acted reasonably or not. Nothing in the doc-
trine of tort law, however, requires the standard to be held rigid despite 
resource limits. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to bear in mind Axiom 1 from the 
discussion of contract law. 58 The earlier discussion showed that the 
physician cannot vary the legal rules governing his relationship with 
the patient. Once he enters into the relationship, the rules of tort law 
dictate that the physician must act reasonably-that is, he must maxi-
mize societal welfare. The combined effect of tort and contract rules 
requires that, if the physician incorrectly estimates what constitutes 
reasonable behavior, he bears the risk of legal liability for malpractice 
and cannot shift that risk to the patient. However, Axiom 1 states that 
the physician can always refuse to enter into the relationship in the first 
place. Thus, as long as physicians retain such discretion, any rule that 
requires physicians to provide services regardless of resource con-
straints would simply cause physicians to refuse to initiate a relation-
ship that would be likely to put them into this predicament. 59 
57. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 28 
(1990). Callahan asserts that a competent, l;ut dying, patient has little right to vigorous life-
extending treatment when such treatment is not likely to be efficacious. He feels that a patient has 
a right only to ask medicine to do that which is compatible with its proper goals and not to extend 
a life in the face of a wholly bleak medical prognosis. He also advocates a shift in priority from an 
individual-centered to a community-centered view of health and human welfare. To do this, he 
would focus upon the amounts and types of health needed to collectively and communally improve 
our society. 
This argument was relied upon by the Oregon legislature in 1987 when it withdrew Medicaid 
funding for certain organ transplants in order to divert such funds to prenatal care programs. See 
Michael J. Garland, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon, I HEALTH MATRIX, J. LAw-MED. 
139, 141 (1991). 
58. See supra part I. 
59. Siliciano notes that physicians and hospitals are free, from a legal perspective (with lim-
ited exceptions), to decline treatment to those who cannot afford the cost of care. Thus, any theo-
retical defense of the current unitary standard must explain how tort law can achieve its goal of 
providing the same quality of care to all Americans when providers have the liability-free option 
of providing no care at all to whomever they choose. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 443; see also 
John J. Howard, Medical Malpractice Liability and Cost Containment: Law and Economics in 
Conflict, 43 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 309, 324 n.l24 (1988) ("[M]edical malpractice law may fail 
to protect the poor ... [because] it does not reach the major device used to withhold treatment 
from the poor, i.e., preventing the physician-patient relationship from coming into existence in the 
1993] A DUTY TO TREAT 365 
It follows that, under the present state of the common law, the 
standard of care must be flexible enough to encourage physicians to 
enter into relationships with patients with marginal resources, such as 
patients who are unable to pay the physician's usual fee or who live in 
rural or impoverished areas that lack expensive facilities and equip-
ment. The patient herself benefits from a flexible standard since, by 
reducing the risk that the physician will be liable for malpractice for 
failing to provide a treatment because of resource constraints, physi-
cians will be encouraged to enter into and remain in the patient-
physician relationship. The patient arguably is better off with some 
care rather than none, even if, in the absence of resource limits, the 
care the patient receives would be regarded as "substandard." 
Yet this conclusion is problematic. For one thing, why would a 
physician ever need to assert a resource-based defense under a flexible 
approach to the standard of care? If the physician suspected that the 
patient's resources would be inadequate, the physician simply would re-
fuse to enter into a relationship with the patient in the first place. The 
purpose· of the flexible-standard defense, then, must be to deal with 
cases in which the physician has misjudged either the available re-
sources or the patient's needs and has entered into a relationship that 
subsequently confronts the physician with insufficient resources.60 To 
the degree that the defense of limited resources is permitted, it allows 
the risk of making an erroneous resource assessment to be shifted to 
the patient and encourages the physician to enter into relationships 
with patients in uncertain cases-that is, where the physician is unsure 
whether the available resources will be sufficient.61 
However, if the physician is allowed to shift the risk of error to the 
patient as the price for agreeing to enter into the relationship, the phy-
sician is able to accomplish unilaterally what the common law of con-
tract refused to allow him to accomplish with the patient's consent. A 
flexible standard of care based on resource constraints seems at odds 
first place."); Morreim, supra note 9, at 278-79 (stating that physicians must consider economic 
matters when deciding which patients to treat). 
60. Another possibility is that the physician declines to guess, perhaps because he thinks it is 
unethical to be concerned about the patient's resources. 
61. The existence of this defense helps to explain why courts regard the relationship as having 
formed only when the physician agrees to treat the patient for a specific condition. See Fought v. 
Solce, 821 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (no physician-patient relationship by mere phone 
call to on-call physician); Lyons v. Grether, 239 S.E.2d 103 (Va. 1977) (relationship exists where 
doctor granted "appointment at designated time and place for the performance of a specific medi-
cal service"). 
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with the protection afforded patients by the common law's limitation 
upon the role of contract. The only difference is that under tort law, the 
courts in a malpractice action occasionally will second-guess the physi-
cian's decision in order to ensure a "reasonable"-i.e., socially effi-
cient-result, while under contract law, the parties are presumed to 
achieve socially efficient results through their own private bargaining. 
Our uneasiness with a flexible tort standard stems from an even 
more fundamental source, however. We have been looking in the wrong 
area of law for the answers, for we have yet to ask the right questions. 
To understand the problem with our inquiry to this point, we need to 
be more precise about the problem with which we are dealing. Thus 
far, we have defined the problem in general terms. That is, we have 
asked whether or not the standard of care should be flexible in l~ght of 
resource constraints, and thus whether resource limits should_. be ac-
cepted as a defense to a charge of medical malpractice. But what does 
it mean to allow the standard of care to be flexible in light of resource 
constraints? What actual situations might it cover? 
One scenario is represented by the following statement from a 
physician to his patient: "As a reasonable physician, T recommend that 
you receive treatment X. My fee for providing this treatment is $Y. 
Unless you can pay this fee, I will not provide the treatment." In this 
case, the physician and patient face a resource constraint in the form of 
the patient's willingness and ability to pay. If the standard of care did 
not vary according to resource constraints and the physician did not 
provide the patient with treatment X, the patient could hold the physi-
cian liable for malpractice if she was injured as a result. 62 Conversely, 
if the standard were allowed to reflect resource constraints, the physi-
cian might successfully defend the suit on the basis of the patient's 
inability to pay.63 
Seen this way, the issue is no longer simply one of whether to rec-
ognize a resource-dependent standard of care-or, in terms of the 
objectives of the tort system, whether such a standard is likely to yield 
the greatest net societal benefit. Instead, the issue is whether to allow 
62. See Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937) (physician undertaking an operation or 
other treatment must, in absence of an agreement limiting service, continue service so long as 
patient requires attention). 
___ 63. When a patient agrees to enter into a relationship with a physician, the patient undertakes 
certain duties, one of which is to pay the physician's reasonable fee. The thrust of the principle of 
a unitary standard of care and cases like Ricks, however, is that the patient's failure to pay may 
not entitle the physician to terminate the relationship or withhold services. Instead, the physician 
may be relegated to an action for quantum meruit against the patienL 
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the physician to refuse to provide medically necessary services64 be-
cause of the physician's own self-interest in being compensated. The 
law must resolve not only the conflict between the patient's self-interest 
and the greater good, but also the conflict of interest between the phy-
sician and the patient. Relaxing the standard of care under these cir-
cumstances affects not only the physician's duty of care, but his duty of 
loyalty. To understand the implications of this realization, we need to 
look beyond the area of tort law and to apply a set of legal rules spe-
cially designed to deal with conflicts of interest of this nature: the rules 
of fiduciary law. 
III. THE ROLE OF FIDUCIARY LAW 
While there is some lingering debate over whether the patient-phy-
sician relationship is properly termed a fiduciary relationship,611 most 
courts and commentators now agree that it is.66 Like contractual agree-
ments, fiduciary rules are designed to allow the parties to gain from 
trade. However, these rules stem from the same concerns that led the 
courts to reject direct contracting between parties for medical care: un-
64. The term "medically necessary" is used to indicate that the patient will suffer some signifi-
cant detriment in health status if the services are not rendered. 
65. A number of commentators characterize it instead as a confidential relationship. See I 
AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § "2.5, at 43 (4th ed. 1987) 
("A confidential relation may exist although there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely 
to exist where there is a family relationship or such a relation of confidence as that which arises 
between physician and patient or priest and penitent."); see also E. Haavi Morreim, Conflicts of 
Interest, Profits and Problems in Physician Referrals, 262 JAMA 390, 391 (1989) ("[O]nly some 
courts and commentators declare that physicians are fiduciaries in the full sense of the term 
.... "). 
66. For example, Morreim recognizes that the question of the physician's duty under resource 
constraints involves fiduciary principles, see Morreim, supra note 9, at 296-301, while two other 
commentators point out that fiduciary principles provide an important basis for understanding the 
nature of the patient-physician relationship, see Joseph M. Healey, Jr. & Kara L. Dowling, Con-
trolling Conflicts of Interest in the Doctor-Patient Relationship: Lessons from Moore v. Regents 
of the University of California, 42 MERCER L. R:Ev. 989 (I 991). Cases that have ~ecognized the 
fiduciary relationship include Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir.) ("The pa-
tient's reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which traditionally has exacted obligations 
beyond those associated with armslength transactions."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. I 064 (1972); Salis 
v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 989, 997 n.IO (M.D. Pa. I98I) (citing Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 
A.2d 803, 805-08 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (Hoffman, J., dissenting); Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty 
& Sur. Co., 237 F. Supp. 96, 102 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("It is axiomatic that the physician-patient 
relationship is a fiduciary one."); Mull v. Strong, 448 So. 2d 952, 953 (Ala. 1984) (fiduciary duty 
to refrain from disclosing information acquired during the physician-patient relationship); Petrillo 
v. Syntex Lab., 499 N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ill. 1986) ("[M]odern public policy strongly favors the 
confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between a patient and his physician."), cert. de-
nied, 483 U.S. 1007 (I 987). 
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equal bargaining power between the parties resulting from the high 
cost of patient monitoring of physician performance, due to information 
·asymmetries and the "credence" nature of the physician's services.67 
Some of these factors are present in other types of transactions and 
have led courts to reject the contract model in particular instances-for 
example, by declaring certain agreements unconscionable.68 In some re-
lationships, however, the disparity of bargaining power between the 
parties is so great and so embedded in the nature of the relationship 
that the law not only rejects the contract model, but also imposes fidu-
ciary duties on the stronger party.69 
Fiduciary rules respond to disparities of bargaining power in a 
number of ways. First, they limit the fiduciary's freedom of action by 
prohibiting him from using his superior power to take advantage of the 
principaF0 and by requiring him to act in the principal's interest.. The 
physician may avoid tort liability merely by acting reasonably,nbut he 
may still be liable for breach of his fiduciary duty if he fails to act 
loyally. Fiduciary rules address the disparity between the parties in 
other ways as well. Where the entrustor challenges her contractual 
agreement or other transaction with the' fiduciary, the burden of justifi-
cation is shifted from the challenging party to the fiduciary.72 Further-
67. See supra notes 33-41 and accompanying text; see also Mehlman, supra note 26, at 366-
77. 
68. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 153 (1981); id. at § 208 ("(l]f a contract 
or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce 
the contract"). See generally Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (absence of meaningful choice in entering into unconscionable contract for the· purchase of 
furniture due to inequality of bargaining power); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhe-
sion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943). 
69. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1064-74; DeMott, supra note 37, at 908-15; 
Frankel, supra note 37, at 800-01; Healey & Dowling, supra note 66, at 1001. These authors 
contend that fiduciary law has evolved in response to the recognition that there are certain legal 
relationships where the conduct of the more powerful party should be subject to a higher standard 
than those found in the law of contracts or torts. It is also important to note that the fiduciary 
concept reflects a relationship of trust in which one party is especially vulnerable. As a matter of 
public policy, the law is willing to impose further protective measures for the benefit of that party. 
70. See Healey & Dowling, supra note 66, at I 003. Healey and Dowling state that the fiduci-
ary receives his power from the entrustor and is expected to act in place of, or on behalf of, the 
en trustor. In addition; the power is vested for the well-being of the en trustor and not for the use or 
benefit of the fiduciary in his personal role. 
71. See supra part II. 
72. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1048 (once the appearance of disloyalty is 
established, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to prove his innocence). DeMott explains that the 
presence of a fiduciary obligation significantly affects the conduct of litigation through its alloca-
tion of the burden of proof. If a suit challenges a transaction between a fiduciary and a benefi-
ciary, the fiduciary has the burden of proving that he dealt candidly and fairly with the benefi-
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more, the fiduciary may be required to do more than merely compen-
sate the patient for the loss she suffers as a result of a breach of 
fiduciary duty; punitive damages may be imposed upon the fiduciary. 73 
This stems from the fact that the information disparity between the 
parties lowers the probability that a breach of fiduciary duty will be 
detected. Health care delivery is so complex that it is difficult. for a 
patient to identify when a physician is ·acting disloyally.74 Fiduciary 
rules respond by increasing the severity of the sanction to deter a 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
The overall effect of these rules is to permit the patient to entrust 
her welfare to a party with greater knowledge and expertise, while at 
the same time minimizing the need to monitor the physician's behavior 
to ensure that the physician acts in the patient's interest. As a result, 
patients are able to expend more of their scarce resources on the 
purchase of health care rather than on the surveillance and sanctioning 
of physicians. The patient at the margin is encouraged to seek physi-
cian services rather than forego treatment because of the risk of physi-
cian misfeasance. 
Fiduciary rules reduce the costs of monitoring and encourage pa~ 
tients to obtain care by inducing the patient to "trust" the physician. 
Trust correlates to the patient's uncertainty regarding the physician's 
behavior. Faced with uncertainty, the patient has three choices. She 
can expend resources to monitor the physician's performance (either 
directly or through third parties such as state medical boards and gov-
ciary. See DeMott, supra note 37, at 900; see also Mehlman, supra note 26, at 396 ("A fairness 
criterion ... plays an appropriate role by reflecting a skeptical attitude toward the effectiveness 
of disclosure. The practical effect of this skepticism is to shift the burden of proving the adequacy 
and effectivertess of disclosure from the patient to the provider."). 
73. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1048 ("[l]f disloyalty is actually proved rather 
than inferred, it may be appropriate for fiduciary law to increase the sanction to include punish-
ment, not just disgorgement of the appropriated asset."). For a detailed discussion of fiduciary 
remedies, see J.C. SHEPARD, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARIES 75, 82, 116-21 (1981 ). See also Hospital 
Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 409 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1991) (punitive damage award sustained 
where patient's injuries were exacerbated by hospital's transfer policy), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
1175 (1992). 
74. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1049. Detecting a breach of fiduciary duty is 
also complicated by the fact that the breach of duty may appear to be merely a lack of competent 
performance. If a patient suffers a poor outcome as a result of something the physician did or did 
not do, it is difficult for the patient to distinguish whether the physician lacked the requisite skill 
or placed his own interests above those of the patient. The patient's difficulty in detecting a breach 
of fiduciary duty is underscored by how rarely patients detect a lack of competent performance. A 
recent study showed that only I in every 7.6 of all adverse events due to negligence resulted in 
malpractice claims. See A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Ad-
verse Events Due to Negligence, 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245, 248 (1991). 
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ernment regulators); she can expend resources to requce the uncer-
tainty, such as by learning enough about her medical condition to make 
choices for herself;75 or she can ignore the uncertainty and behave as if 
she were confident that the physician-would not betray her.76 The third 
alternative constitutes "trusting''-the physician and is embodied in fidu-
ciary doCtrine because it entails thCieast expenditure of the patient's 
resources. 77 
.'A fiduCiary analysis of how physicians should deal with resource 
constraints addresses the effect of the denial of treatment on patient 
trust.· As a fiduciary, a physician is required to act in the patient's in-
terest. When a patient is denied treatment, however, the patient's inter-
est is being subordinated to someone else's. According to fiduciary the-
- ___ oty, this could cause the patient to distrust the physician, thereby 
leading the patient to expend excessive resources on monitoring physi-
cian behavior or to incur the costs of illness rather than obtaining the 
physician's services. In that case, the law might respond by declaring 
the denial of treatment to be a breach of the physician's fiduciary duty 
to his patient. 
The response of the law could depend upon who possesses those 
interests to which the patient's interests are subordinated. A distinction 
might be drawn between sacrificing the patient's interests for the per-
sonal gain of the physician and sacrificing the patient's interests for the 
benefit of other patients or society. The law might be more tolerant of 
the latter because the effect on patient trust might be perceived as be-
ing slight or because other concerns were deemed to outweigh the loss 
of patient trust. In order to understand the application of fiduciary doc-
trine under conditions of constrained resources, we must first identify 
75. Reducing uncerlainty is a priinary objective of informed consent. In the extreme, the pa-
tient attempts to become a "lay doctor." See Susan P. Shapiro, The Social Control of Interper-
sonal Trust, 93 AM. J. Soc. 623, 630 (1987). By becoming more informed, the patient reduces the 
disparity between herself and the physician, which may deter the physician from taking advantage 
of her. However, obtaining information does not necessarily promote trust; rather, it decreases the 
need for trust. See J. David Lewis & Andrew Weigert, Trust as a Social Reality, 63 Soc. 
FORCES 967, 970 (1985) ("[l]f one were omniscient, actions could be undertaken with complete 
certainty, leaving no need; or even possibility, for trust to develop .... Although some prior expe-
rience with the. object of tru.st is a necessary condition for establishing the cognitive element in 
trust, s.uch experience only opens the door to trust without actually constituting it."). 
76. The connection between trust and uncertainty has been explored by German sociologist 
Niklas Luhmann, who states that trust "increases the 'tolerance of uncertainty.' " See NIKLAS 
LUHMANN, TRUST ANDPOWER 15 (1979). 
77. In effect, the patient decides that it is advantageous to accept a risk of being harmed by 
the physician rather than expending greater resources to prevent the harm or incurring the certain 
harm of foregoing the .physician's services. 
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whose interest is being enhanced at the patient's expense and then ad-
dress whether any circumstances justify the patient's sacrifice. 
A. Conflict Between Patient and Physician 
In denying a patient access to care, a physician may face a· conflict 
between his own interests and those of the patient. Subordinating the 
patient's interests to his own might seem to constitute the cardinal sin 
of fiduciary misbehavior and to result in clear liability for the physi-
cian. The issues are not that simple, however. For example, the physi-
cian certainly is permitted to accept a fee from the patient. Yet the 
patient would arguably be better off if she could obtain the care for 
free. By charging a fee, the physician might be said to be placing his 
own interests above those of the patient. However, this does not neces-
sarily constitute a violation of his fiduciary duty. 
If we assume that the physician would riot willingly harm his pa-
tient unless he derived some benefit, we identify the following possibili-
ties in, terms of the effect of the physician's behavior on his and his 
patient's welfare: 
Change in Welfare 
Legal Rule 
Patient Physician 
( 1) Decreased Increased Prohibited 
(2) Unchanged Increased Prohibited 
(3) Increased Increased Permitted 
{ 4) Increased Unchanged Permitted 
(5) Increased Decreased Permitted/ 
Possibly Required 
The essence of the fiduciary principle is that alternative. (1) is pro-
hibited: The fiduciary cannot advance his own interests to the detri-
ment of the principal. A physician cannot refuse to provide a patient 
with a necessary service, for example, in order to increase the physi-
cian's earnings. Some payment systems-such as so-called capitated 
systems in which the physician receives a fixed amount per patient, per 
month, regardless of the services the patient receives-reward physi-
cians financially if they reduce care to their patients. If the patient can 
show that care was denied solely to leave more money for the physician 
at the end of the month, the physician will be liable for breach of his 
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fiduciary duty to his patient.78 
Arguably, alternative (2) is also prolubited: Insofar as the purpose 
of the relationship is to benefit the patient, the physician should not be 
permitted to use the relationship for his gain, even if doing so produces 
no direct loss to the patient. One way of looking at alternative (2) is 
that the physician ha~appropriated an opportunity for gain to himself, 
rather than giving if to the patient. The case of Jlfoore v. Regents of 
the University of California,79 in which the California Supreme Court 
held that a physician breached his fiduciary duty to his patient by com-
mercializing the patient's cells without permission and without allowing 
the patient to receive any of the financial benefit, suggests that alterna-
tive (2) would violate the physician's fiduciary duty. 80 
The remaining alternatives, (3) through (5)~ are aJJ arguably per-
mitted-that is, the physician can act in these ways without necessarily 
violating his fiduciary duty to his patient. The only controversial alter-
native is (3). Some might think that the physician's fiduciary duty pro-
hibits him from benefitting at all. Yet, as mentioned earlier, this is 
clearly erroneous: the physician is allowed to charge the patient a fee 
for his services. 
To answer the question of whether the physician can refuse to pro-
vide services to the patient if the patient cannot pay the physician's fee, 
it helps to rank the permissible alternatives in the order in which they 
would be preferred bythe physician. The order is probably descending: 
the physician would most prefer io gain along with the patient- alter-
native (3). For example, the physician would prefer to receive payment 
in return for any health benefit provided to the patient. The physician 
would be Jess interested in alternative (4), where the patient gains but 
not the physician. For example, the physician would prefer to treat the 
patient himself than to refer the patient to a specialist and lose his 
78. See Bush v. Dake, No. 86-25767 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Apr. 27, 1989) (HMO's capitation and 
risk pool arrangement delayed plaintiff's referral to specialist for pap smear test and consequent 
diagnosis of cancer); Hughes v. Blue Cross of N. Cal., 245 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Ct. App. 1988) (utili-
zation review decisions used to achieve cost control constituted bad faith because they were signifi-
cantly more restrictive than community standards); Joanne Wojcik, Health Plans Urged to Assess 
Liability, Bus. INs., June 25, 1990, at 12 (noting that HMOs are increasingly being held liable for injuries resulting from reduced care). 
79. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
80. See id. at 483. While the facts suggest that the patient was made to suffer expense and 
discomfort in order to enable the physician to profit, the opinion premises the breach of fiduciary 
duty on the physician's personal interests, unrelated to the patient's health, that may affect the 
physician's professional judgment, rather than on the patient's cost of the physician's behavior. 
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fee. 81 The physician would least prefer alternative (5), in which the 
patient gains at the physician's expense. For example, the physician 
would not like to provide care for free because he would suffer an op-
portunity cost of being unable to treat other patients. The physician's 
worst scenario under alternative (5) would require him to pay the costs 
of the patient's care out of his own pocket, such as by having to pay for 
the patient's hospital care to avoid a premature discharge. 
The progression from alternative (3) to (5) involves the patient's 
preferences as well as those of the physician. The farther down the list 
the physician is required to go to fulfill his fiduciary duty to his patient, 
the more the patient is benefitted at the physician's expense and the 
more reason she has to trust the physician. This reduces the amount 
that the patient must spend on monitoring the physician to insure that 
the physician does not act in his own self-interest at the patient's 
expense. 
The fact that, as the patient and the physician move down the list, 
the patient's welfare increases relative to the physician's, suggests that 
alternatives (3) to (5) in the preceding table must be viewed as a con-
tinuum rather than as a set of clearly distinguished option.s. The ques-
tion of whether the physician must treat the patient regardless of re-
source constraints then becomes: How far down the list must the 
physician be wi11ing to go in order to fulfill his fiduciary duty to the 
patient? 
Based on existing case law, the answer, at present, is unclear. The 
question usually arises when the patient complains that the physician 
caused her harm by prematurely terminating the relationship. This 
practice is known as "abandoning" the patient.82 On the one hand, the 
law permits the physician to terminate the relationship by giving the 
81. In some respects, the physician may gain by the referral. Although he forgoes his fee for 
this particular patient (since fee-splitting and kickbacks are illegal), the specialist may reciprocate 
by referring other patients to the physician in the future. Moreover, the physician who fails to 
refer a patient to a specialist risks liability for malpractice if the patient is harmed as a result. A 
rational physician who decides not to refer the patient must calculate that the risk of liability and 
the loss of goodwill from the specialist is outweighed by other factors. Potential factors include the 
patient's benefit of continued care from the primary physician and the physician's benefit of future 
fees from that particular patient. (which would be lost if the patient never returned to the physi-
cian after referral to the specialist). 
82. These cases typiCally are brought as malpractice cases and do not expressly address 
whether the physician has breached his fiduciary duty. However, by delineating the bounds to 
which the physician must go to avoid mistreating the patient, they provide a lower limit to the 
requirements of fiduciary doctrine. 
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patient notice and a reasonable opportunity to obtain care elsewhere.83 
If, as some cases have suggested, a "reasonable opportunity" is defined 
merely as giving the patient a-list of other physicians in the area and a 
reasonable amount of time in which to contact them,84 the physician 
would seem to be able to avoid treating a nonpaying patient by termi-
nating the relationship. On the other hand, other cases, together with 
the doctrine known as the "continuoustreatm~nt" rule,86 suggest that a 
physician who agrees to treat a patient inay have to provide necessary 
treatment whether or not the patient can pay for it.86 In terms of giving 
the patient who needs treatment a reasonable opportunity to obtain the 
care elsewhere, we might say that the physician cannot terminate the 
relationship unless he can find another physician who is willing to treat 
the patient without payment, since otherwise the patient simply does 
not'have a reasonable opportunity to obtain care elsewhere. This might 
require the physician to absorb the cost of the patient's care himseif if 
need be. 
One way to determine the extent of the physician's duty to provide 
treatment is to consider the effect of the physician's behavior on patient 
trust. Assuming that an increase in the physician's willingness to sacri-
fice his own interests for his patient's will yield greater patient trust, we 
might wish to tighten the physician's fiduciary obligations if we per-
ceived a need to enhance trust, or to relax those obligations if we felt 
that the degree of trust was greater than necessary.87 
Numerous surveys and commentators have noted that trust be-
tween patients and physicians has deteriorated.88 Patients report that 
83. See Payton v. Weaver, !82 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1982); Hirschman v. Saxon, 54 Cal. 
Rptr. 767, 769 (Ct. App. 1966) (patient-physician relationship terminated when patient failed to 
keep scheduled appointment and never returned for further treatment). 
84. See Payton, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 227. 
85. The continuous treatment rule states that· a physician must continue to treat a patient 
until the patient no longer requires care for the affliction that led her to initiate the relationship 
with the physician, or until the relationship is otherwise terminated. See Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 
S.W.2d 591, 596 (Ky. 1963); see also C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Liability of Physician Who 
Abandons Case, 57 A.L.R.2d 432, 439 (1958) (discussing physician's right of withdrawal). How-
ever, the rule is not clear as to whether a patient's inability to pay terminates the relationship. 
86. See Wilson v. Blue Cross of S. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Ct. App. -1990); Wickline v. 
California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986); Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208 (Utah 1937). 
87. By virtue of Axiom I, one of the costs of excessive trust would be a decrease in access. See 
infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
88. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Trust and Distrust in Professional Ethics, in ETHICS, TRUST 
AND THE PROFESSIONS: PHILOSOPHICAL AND CULTURAL ASPECTS 77 (Edmund D. Pellegrino et al. 
eds., 1991); Bill Stokes, An Uneasy Alliance: Suspicion, Skepticism and an Army of Outsiders 
Threaten the Doctor-Patient Relationship - But the Condition Is Being Monitored, CHI. TRIB., 
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doctors are more interested in making money than in helping pa-
tients.89 Together with concerns over malpractice liability, the deterio-
ration of trust between patient and physician has significantly demoral-
ized physicians.90 Applications to medical schools have declined.91 The 
absence of trust makes physicians long for a bygone era. As one sur-
geon writes, "I have come face to face with the disheartening fact that 
we don't see such simple trust in our patients' eyes as often as we used 
to."92 One commentator goes so far as to state that "the position of the 
physician in society has taken a 180-degree turn, from respect to 
contempt."93 
Given the deterioration in trust between patients and physicians, 
patients are likely to be devoting an excessive amount of resources to 
monitoring physician behavior. It is difficult to measure directly how 
much patients spend on monitoring physicians in attempting to detect 
and prevent. breaches of fiduciary duty.94 However, if we assume that 
there is a link between malpractice actions and patient trust,95 in that 
Apr. 29, 1990, at Cl4 (Good Health Magazine); Gina Kalata, Wariness is Replacing Trust Be-
tween Healer and Patient, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1990, at AI; Flora Johnson Skelly, MDs and 
Patients: Where Is the Trust?, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 5, 1990, at 28; Joseph D. Wassersug, Con-
sumerism Soon Will Consume Medical Practice, AM. MED. NEWS, July 22, 1988, at 23. 
89. See Kalata, supra note 88, at I. 
90. See Skelly, supra note 88, at 28. 
91. See Leigh Page, Medical Schools 'Enlarge Their Vision,' Embrace Humanities, AM. 
MED. NEws, Jan. 5, 1990, at 28 (medical school applications at an all-time low of 1.6 applicants 
for every place available). But see Leigh Page, Hike in Medical School Applicants May Boost 
Standards, AM. MED. NEws, May 18, 1992, at 15 (applications appear to be increasing once 
again). 
92. Victor Cohn, The Question Your Doctor Doesn't Ask: Are You Satisfied?, WASH. PosT, 
Feb. 20, 1990, at Zl2. 
93. Wassersug, supra note 88, at 23. 
94. One reason is that, as noted earlier, it is extremely difficult to distinguish a breach of 
fiduciary duty from a lack of competent performance. See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
If a physician denies treatment to a patient, the patient may not be able to determine whether her 
subsequent condition is the result of the physician's behavior or the inevitable progression of her 
underlying disease or condition. Furthermore, even if the patient realizes that she has suffered a 
poor outcome due to the physician's failure to render necessary care, she may not be able to 
determine whether the physician has sacrificed her interests for his own. Disentangling the effect 
of the patient's illness or condition from the patient's health outcome following an episode of 
medical care is the objective of the new science of outcome measurement. While progress has been 
made, much work remains to be done before the results can be used to evaluate the quality of 
health care services. See generally Maxwell J. Mehlman, Assuring the Quality of Medical Care: 
The Impact of Outcome Measurement and Practice Standards, 18 LAW, MEo. & HEALTH CARE 
368 (1990). 
95. See William Y. Rial, I Have A Concern For Thee, 248 JAMA 1069, 1070 (1982) (active 
cultivation of patient trust is one of the best ways to prevent malpractice suits); William B. Apple-
gate, Physician Management of Patients With Adverse Outcomes, 146 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
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patients are more inclined to attempt to detect and remedy poor out-
comes if they distrust their physicians, the widely noted increase in the 
severity of malpractice actions, along with calls for reforms to reduce 
the nurriber of suits and the costs of the system, support the 
proposition. 
If patients are spending too much on monitoring physicians, a 
more efficient system could be achieved by increasing trust. In terms of 
the obligation to treat patients at the physician's expense, the physician 
may have to go to "heroic" lengths to provide treatment when re-
sources are constrained.96 The physician may be required to submit to 
one or more of the following: treat the patient without charge, lower his 
fee to cover only his "cost," accept whatever the patient can afford to 
pay, or allow the patient to pay the fee over an extended period. H the 
physician terminates treatment without offering the patient .these alter-
natives and thereby harms the patient, the physician might be open to 
the charge that he breached his fiduciary duty by placing his own inter-
ests above his patient's.97 
2249 (! 986) (trust is enhanced by constant communication anrl joint decision making between 
doctor and patient; when trust is impaired, patient may blame physician for a poor outcome, 
thereby creating potential for a malpractice suit); Irwin Press et al., Satisfied Patients Can Spell 
Financial Well-Being, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT., Feb. 1991, at 34 (reduced trust can yield a 
negative attitude toward care provider and a predisposition to perceive actual harm; studies show 
that patients view healing favorably if service interaction was good, regardless of the actual 
healing). 
96. Barry Furrow calls this a "duty to rescue." Barry Furrow, Forcing Rescue: The Land-
scape of Health Care Provider Obligations to Treat Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIX, J. LAW-MED. 
(forthcoming 1993). However, the rules of tort law regarding this duty suggest that it does not 
require the actor to expose himself to personal risk. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS§ 324 
cmt. d {1965). Thus, since a fiduciary may have to risk a loss of compensation to fulfill his duty to 
his patient, it is preferable to describe the physician's duty as "heroism" rather than as "rescue" 
behavior. 
97. It might be questioned whether patient trust would in fact be enhanced by tightening 
fiduciary rules for physicians. Patients might discount physician behavior on the basis that the 
physicians' actions were the result of a fear of legal sanctions rather than a desire to promote their 
patients' interests. 
Several commentators appear to suggest that legal rules are a functional substitute for trust 
in professionals, in that both allow patients to reduce their monitoring costs. Shapiro caiis this 
"impersonal trust." See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 634 (in impersonal trust, reliance is placed on 
"guardians" and on their monitoring and control mechanisms). According to this approach, pa-
tients turn to legal regulation to sustain their relationships with physicians when they feel that 
trust in the physicians themselves is no longer warranted. For example, Bernard Barber states 
that, in relation to trust, law is an "alternative and complementary mechanism of social control," 
adding that "we need to discover and continually rediscover how to foster trust and make it more 
effective .... [P]aradoxically, this goal can be achieved in part by making its social control 
alternatives and complements more extensive and more effective." BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC 
AND LIMITS OF TRUSTS 22, 170 (1983). Similarly, Mark Granovetter states that institutional ar-
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The heroic behavior demanded of the physician in fulfilling his fi-
duciary duty assumes a different appearance if the source of resource 
constraints is another party rather than the physician himself. Even if 
the physician agrees to waive his fee, a hospital may not be willing to 
admit a patient who is uninsured, a specialist may not be willing to 
accept a referral, or a piece of necessary medical equipment may not 
be found in the area. In these situations, we might say that the physi-
cian has done all that is required once he agrees to waive his fees. To 
increase trust, however, the physician may need to go further by serv-
ing as an advocate for his patient. In Wickline v. State,98 for example, 
the court suggested that the physician had a responsibility to protest a 
rangements that make it too costly to malfease "do not produce trust but instead are a functional 
substitute for it." Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481, 489 (1985). In contrast, Shapiro argues that the mechanisms 
of impersonal trust enhance trust in agents, and that only those strategies that "virtually eliminate 
agency and uncertainty are functional substitutes for trust." See Shapiro, supra note 75, at 636 
n.18. 
However, some commentators are concerned that reliance on legal rules may impair the pa-
tient-physician relationship. For example, philosopher Annette Baier states: "Where the truster 
relies on his threat advantage to keep the trust relation going, or where the trusted relies on 
concealment, something is morally rotten in the trust relationship." Annette Baier, Trust and 
Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231, 255 (1986). 
Furthermore, those who claim that reliance on the threat of the law is a functional equivalent 
to trust ignore the fact that parties turn to legal controls only when trust has deteriorated. Thus, 
reliance on the threat of sanctions constitutes a reflection of distrust rather than an equivalent to 
trust: the greater the role of this threat in facilitating a relationship, the greater the breakdown of 
trust and the level of distrust between the parties. 
Barber appears to accept the relationship between reliance on legal sanctions and distrust 
when he endorses the principle of "rational distrust," which he describes as "rationally based 
expectations that technically competent performance and/or fiduciary obligation and responsibil-
ity will not be forthcoming." BARBER, supra, at 166. According to Barber, this type of distrust is 
not destructive, but instead is "another, and in a sense functionally equivalent, instrument for 
maintaining social order." !d. As a reflection of distrust, however, the threat of legal sanction may 
erode trust in much the same way that 'distrust breeds distrust. Pellegrino observes that parties 
embrace "ethical minimalism" when they rely upon law: "Patients must seek strict contractual r~lationships with their doctors .... Professionals will tend to limit themselves to the precise 
letter of agreement." Pellegrino, supra note 88, at 79. This in turn gives rise to an "ethics of 
distrust," in which "professionals and those who seek their help assume primarily a self-protective 
stance." !d. 
The concern that reliance on legal rules produces distrust is based on the notion that the 
function of legal rules is to punish misbehavior and that physicians will act upon fear rather than 
concern for patients. However, the law can play a more positive role: uncertainty may be reduced 
by reflecting a consensus on the standards of physician behavior. This consensus can be reached 
through a process that includes input from public and private groups, particularly from the medi-
cal profession itself. In this light, the law becomes more a code of conduct than a mere threat of 
punishment, with trust enhanced rather than destroyed. 
98. 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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third-party payer's refusal to pay for additional days of hospitalization 
for his patient.99 Morreim similarly has argued that "under current ec-
onomic conditions, [a patient's] needs also encompass economic advo-
cacy .... The patient ... needs the physician's vigorous lobbying ef-
forts, such as to persuade recalcitrant utilization reviewers of the 
necessity of treatment."100 vVhere resources are lacking in a geographic 
area, the physician's fiduciary duty may require him to lobby providers 
and payers to secure the resources; likewise, a rural physician may be 
obligated to try to convince a legislature or state health department to 
build a clinic in his area or to fund regional access to an advanced 
medical technology such as magnetic resonance imaging. At a mini-
mum, the physician must alert the patient to the need for the resource. 
A physician incurs numerous costs in trying to eliminate barriers 
to treatment created by third parties. Lobbying takes time awayJrom 
his practice. Kn addition, a physician who pressures a third party such 
as a payer or hospital on behalf of his patient is likely to be unpopular 
with that party. A hospital or HMO may take administrative action 
against the physician, such as attempting to revoke his hospital staff 
privileges or to exclude him from the HMOs panel of physicians. 
Nonetheless, the physician might be obligated to undertake an advo-
cacy role on behalf of his patients despite these risks. 
B. Conflict Between Patients 
Thus far, we have only considered the conflict between the physi-
cian's self-interest and the interests of his patient. However; resource 
constraints may also affect physician behavior when one patient's inter-
ests are pitted against those of another patient, a group of patients, or 
society as a whole. 
An example of one patient's interests being pitted against those of 
another is cost shifting. This occurs when a physician increases the 
charges for one patient or group of patients to cover the costs of treat-
ing other patients who are indigent or lack health insurance, or whose 
insurance pays less than the physician's fee. 101 From the standpoint of 
99. !d. at 670. The court noted that a physician cannot avoid ultimate responsibility for his 
patient's care by simply complying without protest with limitations imposed by a third-party payer 
when the physician's medical judgment dictates otherwise. Id. at 671. Thus, the court concluded 
that Wickline's physician should have attempted to prolong her hospital stay beyond the author-
ized time period if he determined that such additional care was in her best interest. !d. 
100. Morreim, supra note 9, at 292. 
101. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 448 ("[H]ospitals· and physicians routinely overcharged 
some patients to finance the care of other patients .... "); Gerard F. Anderson, All-Payer 
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tort law, we might say that the physician is entitled to shift costs so 
long as he maximizes societal welfare, and he may even be required to 
do so in order to act "reasonably." Cost shifting is comparable to 
spreading the costs of accidents, a primary function of tort liability and 
one that is generally agreed to be desirable.102 In terms of the physi-
cian's fiduciary duties to his patients, the physician might be deemed to 
be acting heroically by providing services to those who otherwise would 
not receive them because of resource constraints. At the same time, 
however, the physician is sacrificing the interests of one group of pa-
tients for those of another. It is unclear whether this is consistent with 
the physician's common law duties. 
As a practical matter, cost shifting might not be problematic if the 
burden on those who are made to pay is hidden or small. However, 
difficulties arise if the effect is to deny treatment to the patients who 
must absorb the costs. This consequence is bound to occur at the mar-
gin. As the loss of benefit to the patients who must bear the cost in-
creases and becomes more visible, the physician would likely be subject 
to greater risk of liability for violating his fiduciary duty. to those pa-
tients who were denied services because the resources necessary to pro-
vide those services were diverted to other patients.103 
Yet as John Siliciano points out, this issue is becoming moot. 
Third-party payers increasingly are refusing to absorb the costs of pro-
viding health care services to patients who are not their enrollees.104 
Rateseiting: Down But Not Out, 1991 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 35, 37 (describing a reduc-
tion in the level of cost shifting as one benefit of ratesetting); Deborah S. Pinkney, Report Details 
Increased Cost Shifting by Hospitals, Ali!. MED. NEws, June I, 1992, at 8 (noting that an in-
crease in cost shifting "threatens the stability of health care"). 
102. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39-67 (1970) (advocating cost shift-
ing); JoHN G. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 8-13 (1967) (cost shifting and cost spreading); 
Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 
(1961) (exploring justifications of risk distribution). · 
103. The common law does not seem to provide a clear answer to the physician's dilemma. 
There are no cases in the health law area that illuminate the issue. However, it is interesting to 
note that the recent Oregon Medicaid legislation contains a provision that immunizes physicians 
from legal liability for denying patients medically necessary services when those services are not 
covered by the state plan. See infra note 126 and accompanying text. Under the Oregon plan, 
certain services are denied coverage in order to expand the number of persons eligible for Medi-
caid benefits. Thus, the plan resembles cost shifting by denying some services to some patients so 
that other services can be provided to other patients within the resource constrai.nts set by the 
legislature. The fact that the legislature added the immunization provision suggests that physi-
cians might otherwise be liable at common law if they denied services to some of their patients in 
order to benefit others. 
104. See Siliciano, supra note 5, at 453-57. Siliciano states: 
Because DRG reimbursement payments are set simply by category of diagnosis, there is 
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Soon, physicians will no longer be able to discharge their duty to act 
heroically by simply shifting costs. Instead, they will have to sacrifice 
their own interests to benefit their patients-such as by waiving their 
fees. 
Thus, we find ourselves back at the point where the physician's 
interests conflict with the patient's. 100 Once again, if the objective is to 
increase patient trust, the physician may be expected to perform heroi-
cally by sacrificing his own interests for those of his patients. 
Conflicts between patients competing for scarce resources can oc-
cur in ways that do not so clearly involve the physician's own self-
interest. One type of case is "absolute scarcity," in which there is an 
immediate shortage of resources that canno~ be alleviated by allocating 
additional funds or by reallocating existing resources. For example, 
when a single transplant organ becomes available and there· is more 
than one patient on the waiting list, some method must be used to de-
cide who will receive the organ. The interests of the patients denied the 
organ will necessarily be sacrificed to the interests of the patient who 
receives it. Another illustration of absol~te scarcity is triage, in which 
,...,_, n~ ...... ~....::l~.....,.f r'l. .... k..-.++lo ,.... .... .o...-.+o" ,..._...-.,,.a ""'"'O'~"'l"'ATl" ~n T'\oo....-:1 Af DM"'\t=>T'nPnl"'l.T +r~':lt­
i:111 Q.\_.,\,.,JU\ • .dl l Vl Ua LLJV Vl Va L\...oL) !JJV! \,t _pv1 o.")VJ!l) !JJ 11\..rVU VJ \.IJJH .. d 5'-"J.H .... J L.J. ...,.u,. t. 
ment than can be treated by the physicians available. As in the trans-
plant example, some method must be used to determine priority of 
treatment.106 The triage physician and the transplant surgeon who has 
more than one patient on a waiting list might be accused of violating 
no possibility cif assessing surplus charges against some patients in order to subsidize the 
care of others who are not similarly covered by some form of health insurance .... 
[L]ittle or no portion of the DRG payment under most systems represents an allocation 
for the free treatment of indigent patients. 
Jd. at' 453-54. He further states that the health care system's ability to provide uncompensated 
care is also undercut by HMOs and the remaining potential subsidizers who are Jess willing, under 
current market conditions, to accept the charges assessed by a health care provider attempting to 
finance care for the indigent. /d. at 454-55. 
!05. To the extent that physicians shift costs in order to continue to receive their fees, cost 
shifting pits patients against the physician's self-interest as well as against each other. Unless costs 
are shifted to obtain resources to enable the patient to receive care from another provider after the 
physician has already acted heroically by reducing or waiving his fee, the practice of cost shifting 
may be said to contain an inherent conflict between physicians and patients. 
106. For a general discussion of this issue, see Maxwell J. Mehlman, Rationing Expensive 
Medical Treatmellls, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 239. Absolute scarcity results in an absolute shortage at 
the micro level due to the necessity of a short-term allocation decision. However, the shortage may 
be alleviated for the long term through a reallocation of resources at the macro level. For exam-
ple, more transplant organs might be available if donors received payment, a transaction currently 
prohibited under federal law. See National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988). 
Similarly, triage might be avoided if more physicians were available in the first place. 
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their fiduciary duty to the patients who are denied treatment. 107 How-
ever, the circumstances compel the physician to make a choice. The 
only alternative to that choice is to permit all the battlefield casualties 
and accident victims to die, or to allow the organ to go to waste. 
It would hardly seem appropriate for the common law to subject a 
physician to automatic liability for breach of his fiduciary duty if he 
treats patients under conditions of absolute scarcity. However, the com-
mon law provides little guidance on how he should decide which pa-
tients to treat. Some commentators have suggested that patients be se-
lected on the basis of social worth criteria.108 That is, priority would be 
given to those expected to make the greatest contribution to society. 
This approach actually was employed to allocate access to kidney dialy-
sis in the 1960s, 109 but was widely condemned.U0 Another method 
would give the physician wide discretion and protect him from liability 
as long as he did not act in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory 
fashion. For example, the physician might use medical criteria to select 
patients on the basis of which patient was in worse condition or which 
patient stood the best chance of survival. 111 This resembles a sort of 
"business judgment rule" that is sometimes used to insulate corporate 
directors from liability to shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.112 
107. For this reason, as well as to avoid biased decisions, the government has established a 
system for selecting transplant organ recipients that does not involve the patients' physicians in 
the decision-making process. First, all potential recipients must be listed on the United Network 
for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") waiting list. Then, a point system is utilized to determine the allo-
cation of organs. Points are received in accordance with such factors as time spent on the waiting 
list, quality of match to the donor's organ, existence of certain antibodies, medical urgency, and 
ease and rapidity of performance of the transplant. See generally ORGAN TRANSPLANT POLICY: 
IssuEs AND PROSPECTS (James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989). 
!08. See, e.g., Leo Shatin, Medical Care and the Social Worth of a Man, 36 AM. J. ORTHO-
PSYCHIATRY 96, 98 (1966) (criteria should include economic productivity, age, history of antiso-
cial behavior, and contributions to humanity). 
!09. See, e.g., David Sanders & Jesse Dukeminier, Jr., Medical Advance and Legal Lag: 
Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 UCLA L. REv. 357, 377 (1968). 
110. The best known criticism was that of Sanders and Dukeminier, who stated that the poli-
cies of the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center, which selected patients in part on the basis of social 
worth, ruled out "creative nonconformists, who rub the bourgeoisie the wrong way but who histor-
ically have contributed so much to the making of America. The Pacific Northwest is no place for 
a Henry David Thoreau with bad kidneys." !d. at 378. 
Ill. These two alternatives do not lead to the same patients being selected or to the same 
results in terms of success. When one hospital changed its method of allocatfng access to beds in 
the intensive care unit from favoring those patients in the most critical condition to those patients 
who had the best chance of surviving, the mortality rate dropped from 80% to 20%. See Note, 
Scarce Medical Resources, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 620, 655-56 & n.l88 (1969). 
112. The most extreme example in the corporate law field is Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919 
(Del. 1956). In that case, a shareholder claimed that a director who served on multiple corporate 
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Another approach would ignore differences between patients and allo-
cate scarce resources randomly, such as by casting lotsY3 In contrast 
to employing medical criteria, random selection is arbitrary and might 
lead to odd, non-utilitarian results, such as providing a scarce resource 
to a convicted criminal rather than to a head of state. However, by 
tending to ignore differences between patients based on social status or 
wealth, .both medically based and raJ1dom decision making might be 
less likely to erode patient trust than ailocating resources based on so-
cial worth. 
In other situations involving conflicts between patients, the lack of 
resources may not be absolute, and the physician may actually be able 
to provide treatment to competing patients. Under such conditions, the 
physician's decision not to provide treatment to a patient may be 
termed a case of "relative scarcity": health care for an indivi9ual pa-
tient is limited by the desire to devote resources to other patients or to 
societal uses other than health care. For example, the physician may 
decide that the benefit of treatment to patient A is greater than the 
benefit to patient B. He may further determine that the treatment 
should only be given to A in order to conserve societal resources and 
thereby ensure that patients like A received the treatment in the future. 
This approach is advocated by some commentators as a partial remedy 
for skyrocketing health care costsY4 
In many instances of "relative scarcity," the physician will be act-
boards had violated his fiduciary duty to. one of the companies when he steered an investment 
opportunity to the other companies. The court rejected the claim, stating that the companies must 
have known that the defendant served on a number of boards and could not direct every corporate 
opportunity to all of them. The court observed that "[i]f it was his fiduciary duty, upon being 
offered any investment opportunity, to submit it to a corporation of which he was a director, the 
questimi arises, Which corporation?" !d. at 924. One commentator has argued that, in a situation 
of absolute scarcity created by a unique corporate opportunity, a director who serves on more than 
one corporate board should disclose the opportunity to each corporation and allow them to com-
pete with one another for it. See Note, Corporate Opportunity, 74 HARV. L. REv. 765, 770-71 
(1961). 
The "business judgment" or discretionary approach seems similar to Morreim's suggestion 
that physicians be required to act "reasonably" with regard to resource limits. See Morreim, 
supra note 9, at 308. Although her reasonableness approach might allow the physician to violate 
his fiduciary duty to patients by sacrificing individual patient interests for utilitarian goals or the 
physician's own self-interest, it might be appropriate under conditions of absolute scarcity. 
113. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360, 367 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1842) (No. 
15,383) (in determining who to throw overboard from sinking lifeboat, a court "can conceive of no 
mode so consonant both to humanity and to justice" as casting lots). 
114. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE 202-12 (1990) (arguing that society 
should set outer limits on individual entitlements to health care, but leave physicians free to apply 
the standards within those boundaries in individual cases). 
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ing at least in part out of his own self-interest. For example, he may 
decide to provide care to one patient who is willing to pay more than 
another potential recipient of care. Likewise, he may deny treatment to 
a patient in order to appease a third-party payer who is concerned 
about costs. In these situations; the physician might be deemed to be 
violating his fiduciary duty to the patient denied treatment; the fact 
that the physician's self-interest coincided with the interests of other 
patients or. of society should not excuse him from behaving heroically 
on behalf of all of his patients. 
However, it is also possible that a denial of treatment will not pro-
mote the physician's self-interest. The physician may feel that it is his 
duty to society, or to the beneficiaries of an insurance or entitlement 
plan such as Medicare, to refrain from providing expensive treatments 
to certain patients because the resources are needed for other patients 
or for non-healtJ:l purposes. Indeed, in denying the treatment, the physi-
cian may in fact be sacrificing his own self-interest by foregoing his fee. 
The physician's behavior seems selfless. He may believe that' he is act-
ing reasonably because, by saving money, he is maximizing the efficient 
use of scarce resources. Yet is he acting consistently with his fiduciary 
duties to his patients?115 The answer depends on whether or not the 
physician's behavior erodes patient trust and encourages patients to 
devote excessive resources to monitor the physician's behavior, resulting 
in an inefficient patient-physician relationship. It seems likely that a 
patient denied necessary medical treatment for the benefit of another 
patient or a third-party payer will feel betrayed. Patient trust can be 
enhanced, therefore, by prohibiting this type of behavior as a breach of 
the physician's fiduciary duty. 
In summary, the goal of fiduciary doctrine is to reduce monitoring 
costs by promoting trust. To promote trust, fiduciary rules require the 
115. One analogy arises in the case of corporate directors who divert corporate earnings from 
shareholders to non-shareholder constituencies. The well-known case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), held that such diversion did not necessarily violate the directors' 
fiduciary duty to shareholders, although it was ultra vires under the articles of incorporation in 
question. Approximately 28 states have enacted so-called "other constituency" statutes which per-
mit a diversion of corporate earnings if the interests promoted by the diversion bear some benefi-
cial relationship to the interests of shareholders. See generally Charles Hansen, Other Constitu-
ency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46 Bus. LAW. 1355 (1991). 
Another analogy arises in trust Jaw when a trustee distributes trust assets· to selected benefi-
ciaries where such distribution is not specifically authorized by the trust instrument. While the 
Jaw is very murky on this issue, it appears that the trustee must secure the consent of the disad-
vantaged beneficiaries in order to avoid liability. See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 110 (6th ed. 
1987). 
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physician to further his patients' interests. The rules significantly con-
strain the physician's ability to act on his own behalf or to sacrifice the 
welfare of individual patients for benefits to other patients or other con-
stituencies. It is generally acknowledged that trust between patients 
and physicians has eroded; this translates into a corresponding increase 
in monitoring costs. This condition suggests that, in order to enhance 
trust and reduce monitoring costs, fiduciary rules in the patient-physi-
cian relationship should be applied vigorously, interpreted strictly, or 
botb. 
Yet we have not taken into account Axiom 1.116 . Axiom 1 gives 
physicians the freedom to decide wh~n to enter into relationships with 
patients. The more that physicians are constrained by fiduciary obliga-
tions from acting in their own self-interest, and the more that they feel 
caught between their fiduciary obligations to specific patients and their 
perceived obligations to other constituencies, the less willing they may 
be to enter into relationships with those patients who are likely to cre-
ate these sorts of conflicts, or the more they will insist on being paid. 
Increasing trust therefore may decrease access, particularly for those 
patients who are likely to consume significant amounts of health care 
resources or to have fewer resources available to them by virtue of their 
poverty, their location in underserved areas; or their lack of health in-
surance. Fiduciary rules create a tension between trust and access. The 
fact that we impose fiduciary rules on a relationship means that we are 
willing to sacrifice access to some degree in order to increase the value 
of the relationship to the weaker party: fiduciary rules only protect 
those patients fortunate enough to fin~ physicians willing to treat them. 
This would not be a problem if patients enjoyed an abundance of 
access. In that case, if we felt that the amount of trust between patients 
and physicians was suboptim.al, we could tighten fiduciary rules and not 
worry about a decrease in access. Yet access is a critical problem for 
many Americans without health insurance, and an increasing problem 
for insured persons whose coverage is shrinking relative to insurance 
costs. Similarly, our dilemma would be alleviated if we were not con-
cerned about health care costs. VIe could increase trust by imposing 
higher duties on providers and compensating them for the increased 
value of the relationship to patients. Yet cost containment has become 
a social imperative.117 The question, then, is: Can we tighten fiduciary 
116. See supra part I. 
117. Some commentators maintain that we can afford to spend even more on health care than 
is currently spent. See, e.g., Eli Ginzberg, High Tech Medicine and Rising Health Care Costs, 
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obligations on physicians to enhance trust without sacrificing access 
and exacerbating the problem of scarce resources? 118 In short, can we 
eliminate Axiom 1 ? 
IV. CHANGING THE CoMMON LAw 
Axiom 1 poses a threat to patient access by allowing physicians to 
refuse to enter into a relationship with those prospective patients to 
whom the physician may be required to provide services without com-
pensation or at the physician's expense. One way to eliminate the 
threat from Axiom 1 is to change the common law to make it illegal 
for the physician to refuse to enter into a relationship with a patient. 
This would shift the role of contract a further step away from the di-
rect interaction between patients and physicians: contract rules-which 
are not allowed to govern the terms of the relationship under current 
law-would no longer be permitted to govern the formation of the rela-
tionship. A role for contract would remain, however: contract would 
still govern entry into the profession. While a physician could not re-
fuse to treat a patient, a person could refuse to become a physician, 
perhaps because he disliked the coercive regime under which he would 
be forced to practice. 
In the extreme, a physician who rejected a potential patient could 
be subjected to criminal penalties or disciplinary action-perhaps in" 
eluding the loss of his license to practice. A less severe approach would 
make the physician liable in tort for actual damages sustained by the 
patient as the result of not being treated. A middle ground would per-
mit the patient to recover punitive as well as actual damages on the 
theory that the physician breached his fiduciary duty to the patient by 
263 JAMA 1820, 1822 (1990) ("There is nothing inherently bad about the expenditure of $620 
billion on health care services by a $5 trillion economy. Nor is there any reason a $6 to $7 trillion 
economy should not spend $1 trillion or even more for its health care."). 
118. IL might be objected that the degree of fiduciary duty imposed by the law should not 
affect access. In the absence or relaxation of fiduciary rules, patients would need to expend greater 
resources on monitoring physicians to prevent overcharging, and these resources would not be 
available to purchase access. Conversely, increasing fiduciary obligations may allow patients to 
divert resources from monitoring physicians to purchasing additional services, but it also encour-
ages physicians to demand more for their services or to avoid entering into conflict-laden or less 
remunerative relationships. Either approach would threaten access. 
However, it has already been noted that the excessive cost of monitoring the behavior of a 
party with greater bargaining power provides the justification for creating a fiduciary relationship. 
See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text. Accordingly, it is cheaper to promote trust than to 
monitor physician behavior. Thus, assuming that the patient-physician relationship is formed, re-
ducing monitoring costs by promoting trust is likely to be more efficient than promoting access by 
relaxing fiduciary rules (and thereby increasing monitoring costs). 
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not entering into the relationship; in effect, this would extend the physi-
cian's tort and fiduciary obligations beyond the confines of the relation-
ship to precede its formation. 119 
As a result, the physician's cost of refusing to enter into the rela-
tionship would be increased by the degree of the sanction multiplied by 
the probability that it will be imposed. Ideally, this cost would be set 
slightly higher than the cost to the physician of fulfilling his fiduciary 
responsibilities to his patients. A sanction consisting of punishment by 
the government-either through criminal penalties or disciplinary ac-
tion by state medical boards-would amount to the physician being co-
erced into treating patients. The same effect would be achieved if the 
sanction took the form of a civil remedy for injured patients, although 
the appearance of coercion would be diminished. 
This approach draws a immber of criticisms. The common law 
generally resists forcing people to provide services to others.120 The con-
cern is that the provider of services will respond by degrading his per-
formance. If we hold price constant by refusing to increase payment to 
physicians in return for strict fulfillment of their fiduciary responsibili-
ties, such as by making it impossible for them to shift costs, and if at 
the same time we make it prohibitively expensive for them to refuse to 
provide services at all by sanctioning them if they do so, the only re-
maining variable to manipulate is the quality of their services. The re-
sult is that patients may indeed obtain access, but to a lower quality of 
care. A voiding this result would require additional monitoring of physi-
cians (for example, additional malpractice actions) at an additional 
cost. Such monitoring might be particularly expensive because of the 
inherent difficulty in distinguishing between poor-quality care that re-
sults from lack of competent performance (for which the physician is 
only liable for compensatory damages) and poor-quality care that re-
sults from the physician's resistance to coercion (for which the physi-
119. The nature and severity of the penalty would depend on the difficulty of detecting and 
processing misbehavior. Criminal penalties might be preferred over civil penalties if the govern-
ment could monitor and respond to physician.misbehavior mere cheaply than patients could. Like-
wise, a more severe penalty might be desired to maintain an adequate level of deterrence if viola-
tions were difficult to detect and punish. 
120. The court in Hutchinson Gas & Fuel Co. v. Wichita Natural Gas Co., 267 F. 35 (8th 
Cir. 1920), set forth the "general rule that specific performance of a contract will not ordinarily 
be decreed by a court ... in favor of a party against whom that court cannot efficiently compel 
its performance." Id. at 39. Similarly, the court in Bickford v. Davis, 11 F. 549 (C.C.D.N.H. 
1882), rejected specific performance when the defendant contracted to use his skill and machinery 
to manufacture exclusively for the plaintiff a certain article in quantities plaintiff should order, 
due to the impossibility of the defendant's compliance and the one-sidedness of the contract. 
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cian may be additionally subjected to punitive damages, disciplinary 
action, or criminal punishment).121 
Another problem raised by forcing physicians to treat patients is 
ensuring that the burden of limited resources is spread fairly among all 
practitioners. Physicians who practice in areas with fewer resources or 
poorer patient populations would bear a disproportionate share of the 
burden unless some method were employed to keep track of the provi-
sion of "coerced" care and to reapportion the burden more evenly.122 
Despite its problems, this approach has been adopted by the fed-
eral government. Legislation enacted in 1989 prohibits physicians (and 
hospitals) from turning patients away from emergency rooms unless the 
patient is stable or another hospital has agreed to accept a transfer of 
the patient.123 A Texas physician was recently convicted of violating 
this statute and was fined $20,000.124 
Thus far, coercive legislation has been limited to emergency situa-
tions. The theory may be that quality is a lesser concern in these cases 
because in an emergency any care is better than no care at all. How-
ever, several states are considering requiring physicians to treat Medi-
care and Medicaid patients even in non-emergency circumstances.125 
121. See Cooter & Freedman, supra note 37, at 1052-53 (observing that punitive damages are 
necessary to deter adequately violations of fiduciary duties). 
122. This coercive approach must go further. Even if the law prohibited a doctor from refus-
ing to treat Medicare or Medicaid patients, the physician could escape this prohibition by opening 
his practice in an aflluent area where there would be few or none of these patients. To solve this 
problem, British Columbia initiated a policy to issue billing numbers to physicians. This policy 
was designed to permit the province to control both the total numbe~ of physicians able to bill the 
Medical Service Plan of British Columbia and their geographic location. For example, newly 
graduating physicians trained in British Columbia would be required to apply for privileges. Once 
privileges were gained, the applicants would receive a geographically restricted billing number. 
See Morris L. Barer, Regulating Physician Supply: The Evo/ution.of British Columbia's Bill 41, 
13 J. HEALTH PoL., PoL'Y & L. 1 (1988). 
123. See supra note 47. 
124. See Sullivan v. Bur.ditt, 934 F.2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a failure to weigh 
medical risks and benefits before ordering transfer of severely hypertensive woman in active labor 
violated the statute). 
125. A new California Act would require all doctors to accept 15 Medicare and Medicaid 
patients for every 100 in their care. See California Health Care Crisis Spawns Initiatives, Pro-
posals, 19 Pens. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 634 (Apr. 13, 1992). In addition, the Minnesota House 
of Representatives proposed a health care bill requiring doctors to treat Medicare patients if they 
accept patients from other government programs. See Rogers Worthington, Minnesota Pushing 
Health Coverage For All, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 5; 1992, at Cl. In Massachusetts, the Foundation 
Health Corporation contracted to administer a new Medicaid program. Under this program, each 
Medicaid recipient will be assigned a primary care doctor, and all HMOs that write health insur-
ance will be required to accept Medicaid business. See Mike Pulley, Foundation Steams Ahead 
With U.S., State Contracts, Bus. J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 4. 
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Given: the problems with a coercive approach, we might search for 
other ways to eliminate the impact of scarce resources on the patient-
physician relationship. Instead of placing the responsibility on the indi-
vidual physician to provide access despite resource constraints, the re-
sponsibility might be shifted to the state. Access would no longer be an 
issue to be resolved by physicians at the micro level, ·but a problem to 
be addressed at-th~ macro level through government decision making: 
The government-r-ather than the physician would determine the services 
to which patients were entitled, either directly through a government 
program such as Medicare or a national health care financing system 
as in Britain or Canada, or indirectly by specifying those health bene-
fits that must be included in private insurance plans. 
A thorough discussion of the merits of p.roviding access through 
government health care programs is beyond the scope of this Artiple. A 
few comments are in order, however, concerning the effect that shifting 
the responsibility for access from the micro to the macro level would 
have on patient trust. 
In the first place, it is not clear that relying on government to de-
termine the access to which the patient was entitled would relieve the 
. physician of his fiduciary duty to his patient and the corresponding risk 
of liability. If the government merely established those costs for which 
it (or private insurers) would pay, the approach would resemble pay-
ment limits imposed by a third-party payer. Just as the refusal of pay-
ment by a third-party payer does not relieve the physician of his obliga-
tion to act on his patient's behalf, the physician facing payment limits 
imposed by the state might still be expected to act heroically on behalf 
of his patient, such as by providing noncovered services for free or by 
pressuring the government or other third-party payers to pay for the 
services in marginal cases. To avoid this, the physician might invoke his 
privilege under Axiom 1 to refuse to treat patients who are likely to 
create this type of problem, once again creating the access problem 
that government intervention was designed to solve. 
To avoid this result, it would be necessary to insulate the pllysician 
from liability for refusing to provide services to a patient when the ser-
vices were not covered by the government program. This approach was 
taken by the legislature in Oregon. Under the Oregon plan, a priority 
ranking of medical services was constructed by a state commission. The 
state legislature then decided how far down the list it could afford to go 
in order to provide some degree of health care to all persons with in-
comes below the federal poverty level. To avoid the Axiom 1 problem, 
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the legislation included a provision immunizing physicians from liabil-
ity for failing to provide services that are not funded by the legisla-
ture.126 As a result, the Oregon approach permits the physician to shift 
his loyalty from the patient to the state. The patient in turn shifts his 
trust from the physician to the state. 
In terms of effect upon monitoring costs, it cannot be taken for 
granted that placing the responsibility for access in government will 
reduce such costs. Surveys show that people distrust govern-
ment-probably much more than they distrust physicians.127 Even if 
government functions in accordance with the law, people may fear that 
government will sacrifice individual interests for societal objectives in 
much the same way as tort rules.128 Monitoring governmental activity 
might take different forms than monitoring the behavior of individual 
physicians-11uch as lobbying legislators, learning how to work the ad-
ministrative process, and so on-but it may not be cheaper. Further-
more, patients are likely to continue to monitor physicians-for exam-
ple, to ensure that the physician is providing all the treatment that the 
government has authorized, or that the physician is not furthering his 
own interest at the expense of the patient's.129 The costs of monitoring 
126. See OR. REv. STAT. § 414.745 (Supp. 1992) ("Any health care provider or plan con-
tracting to provide services to the eligible population under [this Act] shall not be subject to 
criminal prosecution, civil liability or professional disciplinary action for failing t~ provide a ser-
vice which the Legislative Assembly has not funded .... "). For a general discussion of the 
Oregon plan, see OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, EVALUATION OF THE OR-
EGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL (1992); The "Oregon Plan": A Symposium, I HEALTH MATRIX, J. 
LAW-MED. 135 (1991). It is not clear that physicians will take advantage of the immunity pro-
vided by the legislature. Fears have been expressed that physicians in Oregon will attempt to 
provide uncovered services to their patients by characterizing the services as "above the line" 
covered services. 
127. There is a basic distrust of government in this country. A majority of citizens would 
prefer that the government provide care only for those unable to afford it. See Christine Woolsey, 
Health Care Reform Plans; Most Americans Want Private Sector to Continue Control Over 
Medical Care, Bus. INs., June 8, 1992, at 1. Public opinion surveys around the nation have also 
registered distrust and disgust at the process by which lawmakers are elected and govern, see 
Nancy Gibbs, Keep the Bums In, TIME, Nov. 19, 1990, at 32, particularly with respect to the 
government's ability to spend money wisely. See Jeffrey A. Perlman, Watchdogs Vie to Oversee 
'M' Funds, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1990, at Bl (voter approval of Citizens' Oversight Committee to 
monitor government spending of tax money raised for transportation projects). 
128. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
129. The manner in which the physician might take advantage of the patient under a govern-
ment program Would depend, among other things, on how the physician was compensated. A 
physician who was paid a set amount per patient regardless of the services he rendered would have 
an incentive to provide as few services as possible to keep his costs down relative to his revenue. A 
physician on salary would have an incentive to shirk. A physician paid a set amount on a fee-for-
service basis would have an incentive to deny services if their costs were high relative to the 
' 
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physicians would be incurred 1n addition to the costs of monitoring the 
government, and together they could increase the overall costs of the 
system. 
Even if monitoring costs do not increase, the more that govern-
ment is entrusted with the task of assuring access to health care and 
allowed to usurp the fiduciary functions of the medical profession, the 
more that the professional role of physicians will diminish. Instead of 
professionals, they will become bureaucrats, mere administrators of 
government programs. 
To avoid this, physicians must resort to enhancing their status as 
members of a group of professionals. If the profession collectively un-
dertakes to ensure that the needs of patients are met at the same time 
that costs are contained, both access and trust might be enhanced. 
Trust in the profession as a whole would help replace trust in inqividual 
practitioners. Indeed, an effective collective response by the profession 
to the problems of access, cost, and trust could obviate the need for 
extensive governmental intervention in the patient-physician relation-
ship. An approach at the level of the profession as a whole also would 
be consistent with the effort to eliminate Axiom 1. The profession 
would define rules for itself, and people would be free to refuse to be-
come members of the profession if they felt unable to live by those 
rules. Contract would still govern entry into the profession. 
The organized medical profession has taken some strides in this 
direction. The American Medical Association ("AMA") has aban-
doned its unwillingness to consider government financing of health care 
and has begun to explore government-supported methods of expanding 
access. 130 The AMA also participated in the development of the new 
payment system for physicians under Medicare that reallocates pay-
ments among different groups within the profession in ways that might 
reduce physician payment for the patient's benefitJ31 Organized 
amount of payment and to provide profitable services of little or no net benefit to the patient in 
order to inflate his net revenue. 
i30. See hmes S. Todd et ai., Heaith Access America-Strengthening the U.S. Heaith Care 
System, 265 JAMA 2503 (1991); AMA, HEALTH ACCESS AMERICA REANEMENTS, REPORT TO 
THE BD. OF TRUSTEES, CHICAGO. ILL. (1991); see also George D. Lundberg, National Health 
Care Reform: The Aura of Inevitability Intensifies, 267 JAMA 2521 (1992). 
131. The Resource Based Relative Value System ("RBRVS") was developed by the AMA 
and a Harvard group to create a better fee system. See Victor Cohn, Deciding What Doctors Are 
Worth, WASH. PosT, Feb. 25, 1992, at Z9; AMA Bd. of Trustees, AMA Policy on the Resource-
Based Relative Value Scale and Related Issues, 261 JAMA 2386 (1989). Once the specifics of 
the RBRVS program were determined there was much dissent in the medical field. Many physi-
cian groups opposed the plan and its acceptance by the AMA, thereby causing a split between the 
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medicine mustnow accept the need for physicians to sacrifice their own 
individual self-interest for the interests of patients and press for a just 
approach to allocating available health care resources.182 If the profes-
sion as a whole is to retain its role as a profession, it must act boldly 
and quickly in this direction. 
AMA and those groups. Due to this split, the AMA has changed its view and now criticizes the 
RBRVS proposal. The AMA said that it' would withdraw its support of RBRVS-based payments 
for physicians if there were not appropriate adjustments to the dollar conversion factor. See Rep. 
Stark Urging Compromise on Medicare Payment Conversion Factor, THE GRAY SHEET (F.D.C. 
Reports, Inc.), July 1, 1991, at 23. As a result of the criticism levied against the RBRVS propo-
sal, Medicare expects to spend seven billion more dollars on its program. See joanne M. Judge, A 
Path Through the Mine Field, 45 HEALTH CARE FIN. MGMT. 10 (1991). 
132. It has been asserted that professional groups (including physicians) should improve the 
status and prestige of their profession by engaging in work for the public interest. See George D. 
Lundberg & Laurence Bodine, Fifty Hours for the Poor, 262 JAMA 3045 (I 989) (caring for the 
poor is a duty of the medical profession and all physicians should give at least fifty hours of 
uncompensated work to the poor each year); George D. Lundberg, National Health Care Reform: 
The Aura of Inevitability Intensifies, 267 JAMA 2521, 2524 (1992) ("[T]rue professionalism 
means self governance, self-determination, and ethical behavior in the public interest."); ELIOT 
FREIDSON, DoCTORING ToGETHER: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL (1976). 
